Starting from the deputy company commander of the Soldier Assault Team

Seeing the thoughtful expressions on everyone's faces, Gao Shijun continued, "In 1997, the headquarters relied on this division as a pilot unit to formally establish the first prototype of the digitalized armored combined arms battalion in the entire army, breaking the single-service organization."

For the first time, tanks, armored infantry, self-propelled artillery, battlefield reconnaissance, engineering breaching, and communications support forces were integrated into the battalion-level organization, truly realizing a small-scale, systematic battalion-level multi-service integration and organization.

After several years of trial and error, by 2001, this pilot battalion had basically completed the joint debugging of the entire set of equipment, system integration, and tactical iteration, and had initially formed a set of training methods, tactics, and support procedures.

Based on this experience, our army established a lightly equipped informationized combined arms battalion as a pilot unit in 02. Well, overall there was progress, but the shortcomings were also very obvious.

The fundamental purpose of our proactive efforts to push forward the combined arms battalion pilot program again is both to verify previous experience and to compare it with the previous lightly armed combined arms battalion pilot program to explore more possibilities.

The achievements of the entire army's decades of exploration in mechanization, digitalization, and multi-service coordination should be truly implemented down to the very end of the tactics.

The goal is to break down the barriers between battalion-level branches of service, establish an independent integrated command system, and fully implement multi-service organization, information-based linkage, and all-element support at the battalion-level main combat unit level.

The aim is to address the decades-long structural shortcomings in the army's tactical level and provide more experience for the entire military to explore a replicable and scalable path for building combined arms battalions.

That's the general background. I believe everyone understands the situation now. Let's all speak freely and have each unit and department share their preliminary investigations and preparations for equipment and personnel reserves.

Or, if you have any ideas or concerns about this pilot project, please speak openly and frankly. Let's clarify all the issues so that subsequent work can be effectively implemented.

As Gao Shijun finished speaking, Zhao Ziping, the army group chief of staff sitting to his left, leaned forward slightly and opened the thick research materials beside him.

"Reporting to the Commander, Political Commissar, and Standing Committee members, the Training Department, in conjunction with the Armored Corps, Infantry Corps, Artillery Corps, Engineer Corps, and Reconnaissance Departments, conducted a comprehensive survey of the entire army group in the early stages."

The problems that the army commander just mentioned are indeed very obvious. The problems of traditional single-service battalions are very specific and prominent.

Normally, each battalion and company conducts its own training and development, with tank battalions practicing assaults, infantry battalions practicing siege warfare, and artillery battalions practicing firepower. The training systems are not interconnected, and the tactical rhythms are not matched.

Although many battalions and companies have strengthened their training and coordination in the past two years, our research has found that there is still room for improvement in teamwork.

During regular training, things are fine, but when it comes to live-fire exercises, especially when the advance is not going smoothly, the problems become more apparent.

For example, once the armored sections have made a breakthrough, the infantry cannot follow up and coordinate, and when the infantry reaches the enemy at the front line, the time required for fire requests and allocation is too long.

Intelligence gathered through forward reconnaissance cannot be shared synchronously with support, engineering, and communications units, resulting in a fragmented operational chain with numerous gaps in coordination.

Based on previous experience and the problems we have encountered, we have initially drafted a pilot organization plan. The new combined arms battalion pilot project breaks down the traditional barriers between service branches and integrates specialized forces such as tanks, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, engineers for obstacle breaching, armored reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support.

At the same time, an independent battalion command structure was established to achieve unified command, multi-service coordination, and full-element support.

Taking into account hardware conditions, training foundation, and mission carrying capacity, the T Division, as a veteran heavy mechanized main force division, has complete tracked equipment and a mature support system, and undertakes live-fire exercises and combat readiness mobilization missions year-round.

Compared to Division B, this unit has a stronger advantage and is slightly better at undertaking this mission. Of course, Division B is also excellent, but their heavy tracked equipment is positioned differently.

After the chief of staff finished his report and put the materials together, he explained that he had been instructed by the army commander to conduct the investigations when rumors had first surfaced. He spoke of the investigations in great detail.

Gao Shijun nodded slightly and looked at the director of the training department. "The framework is set, and the unit has a preliminary positioning. You can talk about the difficulties. Be specific and practical. No need for formalities."

The head of the training department immediately stood up at attention. "Yes, Commander. According to our training department's research and statistics, the biggest problem at present is that there is no data to rely on and no one to use."

The entire army's battalion-level combined arms operations are still in the exploratory stage. There is no unified outline, no mature tactics, and no supporting training system. The training habits and tactical thinking of each branch of the armed forces are completely different after decades, making integration and coordination extremely difficult.

The more fundamental problem is the lack of multi-skilled commanders. A combined arms battalion is not a single branch of service that requires training and command; commanders must have a thorough understanding of all the constituent branches.

Most of our current battalion commanders come from a single branch of service; armored officers understand assault but not firepower coordination.

Infantry officers understand frontline assault but not heavy equipment deployment, and no one has a systematic ability to lead mixed units of multiple branches. This is why we must be strict and selective in our personnel selection.

In addition, equipment maintenance, ammunition coordination, and personnel management after the integration of multiple branches of the armed forces are all entirely new challenges, with no existing experience to draw upon.

After listening to the report, Gao Shijun spoke up at the right time, "The investigation is very good. Now that the difficulties have been identified, let's continue with the follow-up issues."

The political commissar picked up the thread, "Old Gao is right. The success or failure of the reform depends on people. The cadre department should report on the preliminary screening."

After the two leaders of the C Group Army finished speaking, Colonel Tian Ming, the head of the cadre department, immediately raised his hand and opened the thick cadre selection ledger beside him. He sat upright and spoke in a serious tone.

"Reporting to our leaders, we have strictly followed the three hard standards set forth by the leaders, and have thoroughly screened and investigated all battalion-level commanders and deputy battalion-level backbone personnel in the entire group from three dimensions: command experience, combat performance, and reform awareness."

Based on the military region's dual talent reserve list, three candidates at the battalion level were finally selected who met the comprehensive requirements and were qualified for deputy regimental reserve training.

The three individuals have different strengths and weaknesses, and each is suited to different situations; there is no single, absolutely optimal candidate.

Tian Ming pressed his fingers on the ledger, glancing at it occasionally. "First place: Zhang Anbang, deputy head of the training section of the T Division, major at the battalion level, included in the military region's dual pool of command talents and reserve cadres."

This comrade graduated from Tsinghua University with a major in Information and Command, and has a solid theoretical foundation. After graduation, his first post was as the deputy company commander of the 7th Steel Company of the 702nd Regiment of the T Division of our group army, starting from the grassroots armored reconnaissance position.

He was later transferred to Unit 86749, where, according to his resume, he served as deputy company commander and deputy battalion commander. He was extremely proficient in forward infiltration, multi-service joint reconnaissance, obstacle breaching and assault, and special operations.

His command abilities, battlefield judgment, and personal military skills are outstanding; he has received numerous awards and commendations for his meritorious service in special missions and combat assessments.