Starting from the deputy company commander of the Soldier Assault Team

As soon as Army Commander Gao Shijun finished speaking, the political commissar of the group army sitting next to him nodded slightly and took over the conversation, "Comrades, let me emphasize that this adjustment is not a routine minor adjustment of the organizational structure."

As the corps commander just mentioned, this is a pilot program, a structural reform of our army's tactical units.

His gaze slowly swept across the entire room, his tone steady and his point clear: "In the past, the combined arms capabilities of our army group were indeed mainly concentrated at the army and division levels, and at the very least, they reached the regimental level."

As the main combat unit at the front line, the battalion has long been characterized by a single type of service, a single function, and weak coordination. In peacetime, they train separately and are temporarily assigned to other units in wartime, thus failing to form a cohesive system.

The core of this pilot program is to truly bring joint operations capabilities to the forefront.

This is not a new idea we came up with out of thin air; it is the inevitable result of more than 30 years of exploration and iterative reforms across the entire military.

Of course, there was also the pressure from the external situation. The US military's systematic, information-based, and highly integrated multi-service tactics during the Gulf War served as a sobering wake-up call for our entire army.

The model of modern warfare has completely changed; the old approach of relying on a single branch of service to launch a fierce attack is no longer viable.

I am also aware that many comrades are used to the old organizational structure and tactics, and feel that the combined arms battalion is too new and unfamiliar, so they have concerns and even resistance.

This mentality is understandable, but it cannot be tolerated, nor can we passively resist or be reluctant to part with what we have. In fact, the transformation of our army group has already begun.

Two years ago, we reorganized some of the old hero companies, which affected the old foundation and traditions. At that time, many comrades could not change their minds and had objections and emotions.

However, the exercises, assessments, and realistic training over the past two years have yielded steadily improving results and made up for shortcomings year by year. These facts fully demonstrate that the initial reform direction was entirely correct.

Here I would like to once again commend our officers and soldiers for their dedication and commitment to the overall situation, even when they had emotional issues, and for their unwavering commitment to advancing reforms.

Of course, I hope that this pilot program will be completed as smoothly as it was more than two years ago.

As soon as the political commissar finished speaking, Chen Shi, the commander of the T Division, who was sitting in the audience, subtly twitched his eyebrows.

Two years ago, during that round of company reorganization, the first unit to be reorganized was the 7th Armored Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Battalion of the 702nd Regiment, a veteran honorary unit of the T Division, a renowned hero company, the Steel 7th Company.

The reorganization of old companies and the adjustment of old unit numbers caused quite a stir throughout the division at the time. Many veterans and key personnel were holding back their anger. In fact, even after two years, many people in the entire T Division still have a vivid memory of this.

Seeing the various expressions on the faces of the people in the room, some deep in thought and others still harboring concerns, the political commissar spoke again, "Let me add something: reform has never been about indulging in habits or showing consideration for feelings, but about aligning with the battlefield and aiming to win."

It's normal for our comrades to have fluctuations in their thoughts and concerns, but the military transformation cannot wait or be delayed.

Two years ago, we reorganized the company level. It was a small-scale adjustment that addressed the issue of adaptability of grassroots soldiers to different branches of service.

Today, our pilot program for battalion-level combined arms operations is a structural and systemic restructuring that addresses the fundamental problem of the Army's lagging terminal combat system.

If we don't change, we'll be outdated and fall behind, which will lead to losses on the battlefield.

Whether it's an old unit, an old tradition, or an old fighting style, anything that doesn't fit into real combat or can't keep up with the transformation must be changed.

I hope that everyone present today will completely set aside their preconceived notions and attachments to their work units, and align their thinking with the reform plans of the Group Army Party Committee to fully guarantee the successful implementation of this pilot program.

After he finished speaking, the room fell completely silent. Everyone stood at attention with serious expressions, and no one showed any of their thoughts.

Both top commanders of Army Group C have set the tone; this matter must be implemented. The only question on everyone's mind is who will win the bid and how much of their own forces will have to be sacrificed.

As expected, Commander Gao Shijun surveyed the room, tapped the table lightly with his fingertips, and then took over the topic again, continuing to speak in the same tone as the political commissar.

"The political commissar explained it very clearly. Let me clarify this reform process for everyone, and you will understand that today's battalion-level integrated pilot project is not something that can be achieved in one step. It is the result of decades of groundwork and gradual progress."

In the late 1970s, our entire army comprehensively promoted motorization reform, with only one core objective: to solve the problems of slow troop mobility and difficult deployment.

This round of reforms has allowed us to completely shed the outdated mule-and-horse-drawn model, address the most basic mobility shortcomings of the infantry, and enable the troops to truly possess the basic capabilities for rapid mobility and rapid response across all domains.

In the 1980s, the entire army was reorganized into combined arms groups, and the independent establishment of each branch of service was abolished. Specialized forces such as armor, artillery, engineering, and communications were unified into a combined arms command system.

This move completely broke the old pattern of independent construction, training, and combat of a single service branch. At the same time, the entire army simultaneously launched multiple development paths.

For example, heavy tracked units are mainly engaged in deep offensive and defensive operations on the northern plains, while wheeled mechanized units focus on rapid deployment, emergency response, and mobile support. They develop in parallel, complement each other, and explore their own pilot projects.

During the same period, new types of military branches such as army aviation, electronic warfare, and special reconnaissance were successively established and deployed, filling the key gaps in the traditional army's lack of three-dimensional support, electromagnetic warfare, and behind-enemy-lines raids.

These actions have greatly enhanced the combat capabilities of our army, and in particular, filled many blind spots in our army's past operations.

In the 1990s, the Central Military Commission clearly promoted the use of technology in military training, launched a pilot project for the digitalization of the armed forces, and attempted to connect command and information links between all levels and branches of the armed forces.

This approach establishes an emergency rapid response force system, specifically addressing past shortcomings in practical combat such as lagging coordination, intelligence gaps, poor command, and slow response.

Over the years, through continuous reforms, mechanization has provided us with a solid hardware foundation for combat operations, new types of military branches have filled in the operational dimensions, and digitalization has opened up the information nerves for combat command.

However, we have always been stuck on the last and most critical weakness, which is that the integrated command system of the entire army has long only been implemented at the regimental level and above. The main combat units at the battalion level are still fighting alone with a single service.

Over the years, live-fire confrontations and realistic combat exercises have repeatedly confirmed one point: in real combat, it is the battalion and company-level front-line units that ultimately take the lead in attacking key positions, handling front-line situations, and sustaining continuous resistance.

Even if the regiment level and above are further improved and integrated, if the battalion level is not integrated and systematic, the grassroots combat chain will be fragmented, broken, and weak.

As everyone knows, starting in 1995, the 1st Armored Division, a brother unit, took the lead in launching the digital transformation of its main combat equipment.

Upgrading aging tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with information technology modules marked the first major hurdle in the digital transformation of the PLA's armored equipment.