Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

After thinking for a long time, Romanov finally retrieved the ammunition from his memory and wrote the name on a piece of paper.

“Go find him. He was in charge of writing that letter in 1983. He has always had a problem with Dorezari suppressing the matter, but he can’t carry the weight of the president of the Academy of Sciences on his own.”

He then gave Nian Dao two more names. One was the former chief engineer of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, a survivor of the 1975 accident, who later became a consultant at a research institute in Leningrad;

Another was a section chief from the Science and Technology Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Machinery Industry, who was in charge of tracking the RBMK modernization project and knew more about the indefinite postponement of the project than anyone else.

Director Nian memorized the three names, then stuffed the note into the ashtray and lit it.

During her KGB training, she learned an ironclad rule: never leave any written record of important things.

"Thank you."

"You don't need to thank me, I also bear some responsibility for this," Romanov said as she got up to leave, his tone a mix of bitterness and relief.

“I should have pushed for this when I was in office, but I didn’t. At the time, I thought it wasn’t worth offending the president of the Academy of Sciences and two ministries for a ‘theoretical’ risk.”

Now... ha, I'm no longer in power, yet I can say it so easily—what does that mean?"

Director Nian paused at the door and glanced at the portrait of Lenin hanging in Romanov's living room.

"It's a relief that you finally don't need to worry about politics or the big picture anymore, Comrade Romanov."

Remember, all you need to do is be true to the Party and the people; a Communist must never lose sight of their principles.

she left.

Romanov stood by the window, watching her figure disappear into the twilight of early autumn in Moscow, straightened his back, and saluted her.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

The second thing the leader did was to find KGB Chairman Chebrikov.

The location was Chebrikov's office in Lubyanka, the same room Andropov had sat in for fifteen years.

The room's layout remained largely unchanged after Andropov left. A portrait of Dzerzhinsky hung on one wall, and a portrait of Lenin on the other. The table lamp on the desk was the same one Andropov had used.

Chebrikov probably kept these things as a tribute to his old leader.

“Viktor Mikhailovich,” Director Nian said, sitting in the chair opposite Chebrikov, “I need your permission to access a document in the KGB’s internal archives. It’s about a report on the nuclear power plant accident.”

Chebrikov gave permission, and a few hours later, several agents finally found a few documents in Lubyanka's vast archives and delivered them to Director Nian.

Director Nian flipped through the pages and finally found it:

"The State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR"

No. 346-A, February 21, 1979

Moscow

To: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Report on Violations of Design and Construction Standards During the Construction of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

According to materials obtained by the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kyiv Regional Government, the construction and installation of Unit 2 at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant deviated from the design plan and violated construction and installation procedures, which could have led to an accident and casualties.

It has been determined that:

During the construction of the load-bearing structure, the deviation of the beam and column axes reached 100 mm in some parts, exceeding the allowable value specified in the code; the vertical waterproof layer of some sections of the reactor building was damaged during backfilling and was transferred to the next process without being repaired;

Some concrete pouring operations were carried out under sub-zero temperatures without the required insulation and curing measures, raising doubts about the structural strength; welding operations involved the use of unlicensed welders and failure to conduct weld flaw detection inspections as required.

The main reason for the aforementioned violations was that the Chernobyl Power Plant Construction Administration (Director: Comrade Kizima) condoned the construction unit's sacrifice of quality for the sake of meeting the construction schedule targets set by the Soviet Ministry of Energy Electrification.

The technical supervision and quality inspection agencies at the construction site were ineffective, failing to record or canceling discovered defects without authorization, and some building materials and components that did not meet technical requirements were still put into use.

The National Security Committee believes that if the above-mentioned situation is not corrected in a timely manner, it may lead to serious accidents after the units are put into operation and pose a threat to adjacent residential areas.

The State Security Committee recommended that the Ministry of Energy Electrification of the USSR be tasked with conducting a comprehensive quality review of all ongoing projects at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, rectifying any identified defects within a specified timeframe, holding relevant personnel accountable, and making arrangements to prevent similar incidents from recurring at other nuclear power plants under construction.

The National Security Commission will continue to monitor the implementation of the rectification measures and report on them as appropriate.

Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

This is the report from the Chernobyl Unit 2 crew in 1979, and it was signed by Andropov!

Chernobyl is still a construction site that is being expanded while it is still in operation. To date, units one through four have been put into operation.

Meanwhile, construction was underway on Chernobyl Units 5 and 6. Unit 5 was about 70% complete by early 1986 and was originally scheduled to be put into operation that year. In the longer-term plan, it was to be built into the largest nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union!

Historically, Gorbachev's Twelfth Five-Year Plan for accelerated development put enormous pressure on construction.

On the one hand, in order to meet the deadline, problems with construction quality and material supply arose one after another at the construction site for Units 5 and 6;

On the other hand, the operating pressure on the units already in operation is constantly increasing—power grid shortages and planned targets are being pushed back, leading to the compression of maintenance and the postponement of reactor shutdowns.

When Unit 4, which exploded a few months later, was put into operation at the end of 1983, some acceptance tests were skipped in order to complete the process before the end of the year (so that the relevant personnel could receive bonuses and medals).

This is absolutely outrageous! According to the subsequent investigation, one of the acceptance tests that was skipped was the turbine coasting test that led to the accident on April 26, 1986!

Every link in the Chernobyl disaster chain could have been avoided. The KGB knew far too much about this, but they lacked the authority.

Every strategic facility in the Soviet Union—nuclear power plants, military factories, and railway hubs—had a KGB presence, with assigned officers and a network of informants within the facilities.

The nominal mission of this system was counter-espionage and sabotage ("disrupting production" was a political crime under Soviet criminal law), but in practice, shoddy construction, substandard equipment, and violations of regulations were all reported as "potential hazards that could lead to destructive consequences."

However, the KGB only had the right to report, not the right to dispose of. The KGB's power was already terrifying, and it was neither reasonable nor ethical to allow it to expand further. Therefore, the KGB could not control the production plans of ministries.

The report was forwarded by Andropov to higher authorities, who then forwarded it to the ministry in question for "research and handling," and then nothing came of it.

This is a classic cycle of the Soviet system.

Chebrikov took the document personally signed by Andropov and looked up at Director Nian.

This is Andropov's legacy, and now it must be passed on to his descendants to complete. As the old saying goes, if this legacy cannot be handed over peacefully, it will be handed over amidst turmoil; otherwise, it may lead to bloodshed and chaos. What will happen to the Soviet people? Only heaven knows.

"What do you want me to do?"

"I need you to conduct a new on-site verification at Chernobyl and produce a fresh report from 1985. At the same time, formally retrieve the old report issued by Andropov in 1979 from the archives and place both reports together:"

The old chairman discovered the problem six years ago; if six years later the problem has not only not been solved but has become even more serious—you know the weight of this document.

"To whom should the materials be sent? The Council of Ministers, the Central Committee, or the Supreme Political Bureau?"

"To Prime Minister Ryzhkov, the Council of Ministers is establishing a Nuclear Power Safety Audit Committee, which is a supporting measure for the Twelfth Five-Year Acceleration Strategy."

The KGB submitting monitoring reports to the Council of Ministers according to procedure is a perfectly routine operation, and no one can find fault with it.

Chebrikov agreed: "I'll arrange for the Sixth Directorate to launch an investigation next week, and the 1979 files will be available within two days. But there's one condition—this matter has nothing to do with you or Ivanov from beginning to end. The KGB's work is their own judgment and their own action, understand?"

He must distance himself from the situation; consider the cards Slava holds now:

The KGB chairman is a friend, the Ministry of Defense is an ally, the chairman of the Council of Ministers is an ally, the second secretary in charge of cadres is an ally, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has influence.

This is no longer a political alliance; this is a power grab.

He knew all too well that Beria's downfall in 1953 and Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964 were due to the combination of these departments!

Gorbachev didn't need to believe Slava was planning a coup; he only needed to realize that Slava had the capability to do so before he could launch a massive purge.

"of course."

Director Nian stood up to leave. Just as he reached the door, Chebrikov suddenly spoke.

"Nadezhda Ivanovna, if Yuri were watching us from heaven, what do you think he would say about what we've done all these years?"

The director did not turn back.

"My heart and actions are as clear as a mirror, and all my deeds are for the sake of justice."

Then she pushed open the door that Andropov had pushed countless times and went out.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Soon, a KGB Sixth Directorate inspection team moved into the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the last week of September, ostensibly as a routine operation for the annual strategic facility safety assessment.

The head of the inspection team was a senior colonel from the KGB's Sixth Directorate, who received a brief instruction from Chebrikov himself before entering the station:

"Focus on construction quality and the implementation of operating procedures, paying particular attention to the rectification and implementation of issues mentioned in the 1979 and 1984 reports. The report should be sent directly to the Chairman's Office."

On September 27, the same day the inspection team entered Chernobyl, the 9-year-old Politburo member Nikolai Tikhonov officially retired, and the legacy of the Dnieper Party was now handed over to Sherbitsky.

On the same day, Ryzhkov, citing the requirement of the "12th Five-Year Plan" to accelerate the development of nuclear power capacity and the premise that such acceleration must be based on quality and discipline, established a Nuclear Power Construction and Operation Safety Audit Committee under the Council of Ministers.

The committee is composed of representatives from the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Energy, and the National Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

Representatives from the Ministry of Machinery Industry were invited to attend, but did not have formal seats, because the committee audited operational safety while the Ministry of Machinery Industry was in charge of design and development. According to the division of labor, it only needed to provide technical explanations.

That's exactly what I need – technical documentation!

Gorbachev had no reason not to approve it. After all, the statement that acceleration must be based on quality was something he himself had said at the April plenary session, and an audit committee established with this in mind was essentially carrying out his instructions.

When he signed the agreement, he never considered Chernobyl; there were dozens of large industrial facilities in the Soviet Union that could be subject to such audits.

But both Nian and Ryzhkov knew that this committee had only one real goal from the very first day it was established.

In early October, the two reports arrived at Ryzhkov's desk almost simultaneously.

The first is the 1985 safety assessment report submitted by the KGB's Sixth Directorate's Chernobyl verification team.

In layman's terms, the report revealed extensive shoddy workmanship, numerous operator violations in the Unit 4 operation log, and a failure to repair essential equipment throughout the nuclear power plant, as repairs would require shutdowns, which would prevent the fulfillment of power generation targets.

The second document is the one personally signed by then-KGB Chairman Andropov in 1979.

The two reports, put together, finally produced the result everyone wanted to see:

Six years ago, the former chairman discovered construction quality problems at a nuclear power plant and issued a warning at the highest level. Six years later, a new round of inspections found that not only had those problems not been resolved, but new operational safety hazards had also been added.

What exactly happened during those six years?

The answer is that nothing happened. The report was written, signed, circulated, studied, and then forgotten.

After reviewing the two reports, Ryzhkov immediately issued instructions to the audit committee:

"Immediately arrange a closed-door technical hearing, and invite the technical leaders from the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Machinery Industry to attend and give a comprehensive explanation of the safety status of the RBMK reactor!"

Director Nian was also busy at this time, because everyone's goal was to make a big fuss and force all the bureaucrats who wanted to get away with it to take the elephant in the room seriously.

For the past two weeks, the Director-General has been pushing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to review the Soviet Union.

Her proposal was this: the Soviet Union would take the initiative to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct an operational safety review of Soviet nuclear power plants, as a gesture of goodwill to demonstrate to the West "Soviet-style Gorbachev's new era thinking and open diplomacy" before the Geneva Summit in November.

This is a case of using someone else's strength against them; Gorbachev was eager to build a new international image—a Soviet Union willing to embrace transparency and international cooperation.

Then let's make it transparent for him!

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze hesitated upon seeing the proposal, his intuition telling him that allowing foreigners to inspect Soviet nuclear power plants was politically sensitive.

However, excessive wheelchair use can lead to brain degeneration, Director Nian said:

"Comrade Minister, since the Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979, the international community has paid much more attention to nuclear safety. The IAEA's review mechanism is an international standard practice established in 82, and many Western countries have already undergone review."

If the Soviet Union proactively invited a review, it would first demonstrate our confidence in the safety of our nuclear power plants, and second, show our willingness to participate in the international nuclear security cooperation system—which is entirely consistent with the concept of common security proposed by the General Secretary in his speech at the UN General Assembly.

"What are you babbling about? Just tell me where I want to get my stamp."

"Sign here, Comrade Minister."

Thus, Shevardnadze signed and stamped the document, and then extended an invitation to IAEA Director General Blix through diplomatic channels.

However, Director Nian knew that the Soviets would definitely arrange a VVER power station (such as Novovoronezh) as the subject of the review rather than RBMK, because RBMK's military lineage and level of secrecy determined that it could not be opened to foreigners.

RBMK is a modified military reactor used to produce plutonium-239, a raw material for nuclear weapons, and it cannot be shown to foreigners casually.

Therefore, the true value of this invitation lies not in the inspection itself, but in the time pressure it creates.

Once the review date is announced, the Soviet system triggers a conditioned reflex that has existed for decades:

"Foreign guests are coming, let's close the door and do a thorough cleaning!"

Any foreign delegation visiting the Soviet Union would be subject to a frenzied internal purge. Even if the foreigners were going to Novovoronezh instead of Chernobyl, Ryzhkov could still demand an internal review of all nuclear power plants on the grounds that "we cannot expose the safety problems of any power plant in the context of international review."

Now, internal auditing has transformed from a power struggle within the Soviet Communist Party into a defense of national honor, and even the most conservative cadres in the Politburo would not oppose it!

perfect!

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

In the fourth week of October, a closed-door technical hearing was held at the Council of Ministers building.

The chairman of the audit committee sat in the main seat, flanked by the operation team from the Ministry of Energy and the design team from the Ministry of Machinery Industry. The representative from the National Nuclear Energy Administration sat in a corner, like a small stone sandwiched between two mountains, trying to remain inconspicuous.

The two KGB reports had been distributed to all attendees in advance.

The hearing began with the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy's core argument was: