Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

The working group members came from different ministries and represented different interests. Their common skill was to kill time with endless research and argumentation until the problem itself became less urgent or the person who raised the problem had been transferred.

By the time they finished their discussion, the Soviet Union had already collapsed!

Gorbachev did it on purpose; he was unwilling to see Slava's power strengthen, nor did he want Sherbitsky to continue fighting him.

Two days later, Slava learned from another source what messages Gorbachev had passed to him and Sherbitsky respectively.

The message to him was conveyed through the Director of the General Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee:

"...The General Secretary greatly appreciated Comrade Ivanov's enthusiasm and vigilance, but warned him to be politically aware and consider the overall situation. Reform is not a one-man show; one must trust the organization and the Party. The primary task at present is to maintain stability in the local area and avoid causing unnecessary panic."

Slava heard the information about Sherbitsky indirectly through his KGB connections:

“Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky, I have noticed that some comrades have recently raised sharp opinions on the work in Ukraine, especially on energy security, which has caused unease in the Central Committee.”

I hope you can personally oversee the rectification efforts and prevent these voices from interfering with the overall interests of the Republic.

He arranged for the two people that Gorbachev wanted to weaken to be on a path of mutual attrition.

If Slava fails to handle Sherbitsky, he will continue to complain to Moscow, thus providing Gorbachev with more ammunition to attack Sherbitsky. If Sherbitsky retaliates against Slava, it will expose his abuse of power in Ukraine, thus giving Gorbachev more excuses to purge.

Regardless of who wins or loses, the winner is the General Secretary of Moscow.

But what about the vast majority of people?

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

September 8, evening.

As dusk falls outside the window in Ukraine, the sunflower fields transform into a deep golden sea in the sunset. In the distance, the diesel engine of a tractor chugs along, and the air is filled with the acrid smell of burning harvested wheat stalks.

"Traitor... spy... sellout..."

Slava paced the room like a caged beast. If he couldn't intervene in the Ministry of Energy, how could he prevent the impending Chernobyl nuclear accident? And how could he advance information technology?

He was desperately trying to save Ukraine, but the country's top leader was using him as a pawn to manipulate against another pawn!

No one cares what the numbers jumping around on those information terminals every day mean. They mean a more efficient resource allocation system, a more transparent management structure, and an economy that brings people one step closer to making life a little better...

All of these were merely tools Gorbachev used to intimidate local lords on his chessboard.

Does Goethe's work live up to the expectations of the Party and the people, Lenin, and the cause of communism?!

"boom!"

The more he thought about it, the more confused he became, and he angrily swept the desk lamp against the wall.

Gorbachev! I'll fuck your mother!

Chapter 55 The people will remember him forever (9.5K)

According to Gorbachev, Slava has given up after being kicked out of the joint working group, seemingly accepting his fate.

But Slava said:

"Patience is not admitting defeat; patience is about having a positive outlook and being able to persevere!"

On the surface, he did not call anyone in Moscow this week, did not write to the leader, and did not express any opinions on energy policy at any event.

He spent all his time traveling back and forth between pilot factories and agricultural informatization nodes—in the eyes of the Politburo, this agricultural secretary, who had been reprimanded by the General Secretary, had finally learned to "be politically aware and consider the overall situation," and had honestly gone back to farming.

In fact, Slava was collecting power grid data this week. He knew he couldn't beat Gorbachev alone and had to use data to persuade more allies and get more people involved!

So he asked Krasovsky to show him the power grid data from Ukraine's information network.

As luck would have it, Slava's information and information network included an interface that most people didn't notice from the very beginning of its design.

To monitor the power supply stability of each information node, the system automatically records the power supply situation in the area where each node is located:

Voltage fluctuations, power outage frequency, load changes...

These data were originally just maintenance logs used to diagnose "why a certain terminal crashed again," but when Slava aggregated several months' worth of data for trend analysis, the stories they told went far beyond the power on/off status of a single terminal.

Krasovsky quickly compiled the data into charts and sent them to Slava.

“What are these?” Slava pointed to several data points on the chart that deviated significantly from the normal values.

"These points correspond to power grid dispatch data in northern Kyiv Oblast. Industrial electricity load in that region has experienced abnormal fluctuations over the past three months, and the frequency of reported incidents is about 40 percent higher than the Ukrainian average."

What's in that area?

Krasovsky pointed to a point on the map:

"Chernobyl nuclear power plant."

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

In the world before he traveled through time, Chernobyl was the worst nuclear disaster in human history.

A city permanently sealed off, the health of hundreds of thousands ruined—the ultimate evidence of the extent of the corruption within the Soviet system...

From the very first day he transmigrated into this world, he knew what would happen in the early morning of April 26, 1986. He knew every technical detail of that disaster—the positive cavitation coefficient of the RBMK reactor, the end-effect of the graphite ends of the control rods, the forced implementation of the experiment, and the operators' ignorance of the reactor's physical properties...

He used to be powerless and could only watch the tragedy unfold, but now he can.

He called Director Nian that evening.

"Boss, I need you to do something for me, it's about nuclear power plants."

The sound of Director Nian cracking sunflower seeds on the other end of the phone stopped.

"explain."

"Our information system collected a set of power grid data in Ukraine, showing that the frequency of equipment repair requests in the area where the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located in northern Kyiv Oblast is abnormally high."

I need you to obtain the KGB's annual safety monitoring reports on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant through Chebrikoff's channels.

I know these reports exist. The KGB has on-site surveillance at every strategic facility; you can definitely find them.

What do you want to do?

“I want to bring these reports back to the surface.”

After a moment's thought, the leader warned:

"Do you know what you're touching? Nuclear power is the domain of the Ministry of Machinery Industry and the Ministry of Energy. The Ministry of Machinery Industry is in charge of design and science, while the Ministry of Energy is in charge of operation—"

These are two of the largest industrial ministries! And you, an agricultural secretary, are going to inspect the safety of a nuclear power plant? My God—wait, I know what you're up to now, no wonder you came to see me!

"This is called outsmarting the system, honey. We let the data speak, let the KGB files speak, let the system speak for itself."

As for me? I was just the whistleblower.

“Okay. But this can’t be rushed. You must not do anything related to nuclear power in Ukraine, do you hear me? You are being watched by Gorbachev. If you get involved in nuclear power, it will give him a reason to get rid of you completely.”

"I know, I know. The information system flagged the abnormal data, the KGB submitted the file according to procedure, and Ryzhkov discovered the problem. I'm just that harmless idol farming in Ukraine."

Give me two weeks.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

The Soviet nuclear power industry had a unique institutional structure that was little known to outsiders—it was managed by two independent systems that were not subordinate to each other and often disliked each other.

The first system was the medium-sized machinery manufacturing department.

Although the name of this ministry sounds like that of an ordinary industrial sector that produces lathes and bearings, it was actually the head of the Soviet nuclear weapons and nuclear industry—it was in charge of everything from uranium mining to uranium enrichment production, from nuclear warhead manufacturing to military reactor design!

It was called the "Ministry of Medium Machine Building" instead of the "Ministry of Nuclear Industry" because the Soviet Union's tradition of secrecy required that the true identity of the nuclear industry be covered by a harmless civilian name.

Just like Lubyanka Square, where the KGB headquarters is located, was once marked on the map as "an ordinary office building opposite the Children's World Department Store," it was harmless.

The Ministry of Machinery Industry of the Central Soviet Union oversaw the design and scientific research of nuclear reactors throughout the Soviet Union. The Nikit Institute was the chief design unit for the RBMK reactor, and its director was Nikolai Dorezzali, an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The director was a Hero of Socialist Labor, a recipient of the Lenin Prize, and one of the founders of the Soviet nuclear industry. Meanwhile, the scientific leader of RBMK was Anatoly Alexandrov, the 82-year-old director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Research Institute and president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

These two men together represented the highest authority in Soviet nuclear science, and their attitude toward RBMK can be summed up in one word: pride.

RBMK is their proudest child.

It evolved from a military plutonium-producing reactor in the 1950s into the largest commercially deployed reactor model in the Soviet Union, with more than a dozen RBMKs in operation throughout the Soviet Union, from Leningrad to Kursk to Chernobyl to Ignalina.

This type of reactor has a feature that has been repeatedly touted by the authorities: absolute safety.

So safe that it didn't need to build an expensive fully contained containment structure like Western light water reactors, the RBMK plant was just an ordinary industrial building because "Soviet reactors wouldn't have any problems."

In the past, there have been proposals to increase security levels, but they were either blocked by bureaucrats, constrained by budgets, or rejected by these two academic cliques!

The second system is the Department of Energy and Electrification. Once a nuclear power plant is built and handed over for operation, it falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy, which is responsible for daily operation, staffing, production planning, and equipment maintenance.

The problem is that most of the officials and engineers in the Ministry of Energy come from thermal power backgrounds, and they manage nuclear power plants using the same approach they use for thermal power plants: achieving power generation targets, ensuring grid supply, and controlling operating costs.

Therefore, if the designers know the physical characteristics of the reactor but don't operate it, and the operators work on it every day but can't see the complete design documents, then this is a big problem!

Many key parameters of RBMK—such as how dangerous the positive cavitation coefficient is, and what a low operating reactivity margin means—are vaguely described in the operator's manual.

This information belongs to the confidential system of the Ministry of Machinery Industry, while the State Nuclear Energy Administration, which was established in 1983, is a weak regulatory agency without actual law enforcement power. It cannot be included in the confidential system of the Ministry of Machinery Industry and only has the right to make suggestions to the Ministry of Energy!

The responsibility for safety has been diluted between these two ministries to the point that no one is truly accountable, and then it is the people who have to pay the price.

Moreover, there are precedents for RBMK reactor malfunctions. The Chernobyl accident was not the first time. In 1975, a radioactive leak occurred in Unit 1 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant due to damage to the fuel passage. However, due to secrecy, the lessons were not disseminated within the system.

The Chernobyl operators had no idea what had happened in Leningrad or what the problem was; they probably didn't even know the accident had occurred!

Then, in 1983, during commissioning of Unit 1983 of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (located in Lithuania, also part of the RBMK), the so-called "terminal effect" was discovered:

The control rod has a graphite replacement section at the bottom. When inserted from the full lift position, the graphite section enters the lower part of the core before the absorption section in the first few seconds, which will temporarily increase rather than decrease reactivity.

In other words, under certain core conditions, pressing the emergency shutdown button for the first few seconds is equivalent to stepping on the accelerator.

This is exactly what would have happened on April 26, 1986, when the Chernobyl operator pressed the AZ-5 emergency shutdown button.

Was any rectification carried out after the 83 accident? Yes!

After discovering this, NIKIET, the reactor's chief design unit, analyzed it and sent letters to each RBMK power plant, proposing operational restrictions and including the control rod structure modification in the "modernization plan".

And then... that was it.

The modification was not carried out because modifying the control rods of more than a dozen RBMK units across the Soviet Union would mean that each unit would have to be shut down for construction, delaying power generation plans.

The Department of Energy's power plants are burdened with production targets, and no one is willing to shut down for a "theoretically possible anomaly that is only dangerous under extreme conditions." As a result, the renovation was categorized as "to be implemented gradually in the future."

In the language of Soviet bureaucrats, this was tantamount to an indefinite postponement.

Even without modifications, operators could be made aware of the operational limitations, but in reality, these limitations were not clearly written into the operating procedures, and the Chernobyl operators were completely unaware of the existence of the end-effects.

Finally, the reason for these two academic cliques is face.

The official positioning of RBMK is "absolutely safe". To admit that the reactor design has fundamental design flaws is tantamount to slapping academic giants Alexander and Dolezali in the face!

Therefore, the problem was quickly identified as an operational management issue rather than a design issue.

Now, all Slava needs to do is bring the information that already exists, which was produced by the system itself and then ignored by the system itself, back into the decision-making field of vision.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Director Nian immediately took action after hanging up with Slava.

On September 3, Director Nian visited Romanov.

Romanov looked better when he opened the door than last time; three months into his "retirement," he had probably found a way to live with his new identity.

"You're here again." "I have something to ask you."

Director Nian sat down on his living room sofa and got straight to the point.

“Grigory Vasilyevich, if I remember correctly, when you were in charge of the defense industry in the Secretariat, the Department of Medium Machine Building was your jurisdiction, right?”

The RBMK reactor in Leningrad experienced a control rod end-effect problem in 1983 when Ignalina discovered it. NIKIET sent letters to all power plants demanding rectification, but it hasn't been implemented to this day. Which of your former colleagues knows the most about this?

They've really found the right person, because Romanov had served as a secretary in Leningrad for over a decade before being ousted by Gorbachev, and he was very knowledgeable about military industry matters.

But what is Director Nian trying to do? Since his retirement, his old subordinates have been distancing themselves from him, fearing that Gorbachev will find a new excuse to get rid of them.

He's no longer a person now, so his words may not carry any weight.

"Where did you learn about Ignalina?"

“The abnormal power grid data collected by the information system caught our attention, and we followed the clues to check some public and semi-public technical documents.”

This answer is technically sound. The Ignalina incident was not entirely secret within the Soviet nuclear industry; it was just not widely publicized.

Romanov understood; he knew why the director had come to ask this question—Slava was preparing for the nuclear electric arm.

If this succeeds, it will be a heavy blow to those living fossils of the Brezhnev era in the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Machinery Industry, who have never taken Romanov seriously in the past twenty years!

Even though he was the Central Secretary in charge of the defense industry, they dared to use the excuse that "the technology is too complicated for you to understand" to brush him off.

"Let me recall... what was the name of NIKIET's first deputy director again...?"