Rebirth: I am in Jin-Cha-Ji

He was so anxious that his mouth was full of bubbles.

Because the central government's order is now clear, that is, land reform must be completed in 1948. If the central government had previously discussed with the local central bureaus and local regions, it hoped that the local central bureaus and local regions would complete land reform within the year.

At that time, many local central bureaus and local regions said that they had many problems and hoped that the central government could give them more time.

The central government also understood the particularities of the newly liberated areas, so it did not force them too much.

But it's different now.

As the Sino-Soviet negotiations began and the Soviet Union began to support China's industrial construction, the central government absolutely could not allow the land reform work to be dragged out, because the subsequent industrial construction required national coordination and planning.

And land reform is the foundation.

The government must take control of the countryside.

Therefore, the Chairman sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and local bureaus in Moscow, demanding that the land reform work must be completed in 1948.

With the arrival of the Chairman's telegram, the central government's attitude began to harden, and the local bureaus were unable to bargain. Of course, the central government would also consider some special places, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, and would still give them some time.

Why is Deng Zhihui anxious?

This is because the land reform in the Central South Bureau was not going very smoothly.

It's not just Guangdong that has problems, other provinces have them too.

The Central South Bureau's land reform efforts are proceeding most smoothly in Jiangxi and Fujian, where a large number of North China cadres have moved south. However, even in Jiangxi, Fujian, and Jian, the current land reform efforts are still facing many problems.

This made Deng Zhihui very dissatisfied.

So, when he convened the land reform meeting this time, he was completely blunt and said directly, "The central government's order is very clear. All provinces must complete land reform within this year. Everyone must be clear about this. There is no room for bargaining."

Secretary Deng, land reform cannot be carried out simply by issuing an order."

Chu He, Vice Chairman of the Hunan Military and Political Committee and responsible for land reform in Hunan, spoke out.

Chu He was the most experienced and highest-ranking cadre in charge of land reform in various provinces. A graduate of Northwestern University and Peking University, he was a Party member during the Great Revolution, participated in the Nanchang Uprising, and was one of the 36 individuals who signed a letter of guarantee and walked out of prison in 61.

Participated in organizing and leading the Jidong Uprising.

Later, because the troops were affiliated with the 8th Column, he began to become a cadre of the 8th Column.

Over the years, I have followed the troops in battles across the country.

He is currently serving as deputy political commissar and director of the political department of the 15th Corps. He is also deputy secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, vice chairman of the Hunan Military and Political Committee, and director of the Hunan Land Reform Committee.

"Let's talk about Hunan. We didn't fight much during the liberation. Most areas surrendered under the powerful military and political offensive of our army. Hunan's vast merchants and landlords also chose to support the liberation. As a result, a large number of people from the old regime were retained. Now that we are going to carry out land reform, many of them will be involved. There will be many obstacles to carrying out many tasks.

Chu He spoke out about the problems in Hunan.

Cheng Qian's choice to revolt has both advantages and disadvantages.

The benefits are obvious.

After Cheng Qian chose to revolt, the main forces in Hunan all chose to revolt or surrender. As for the local militias, their combat effectiveness was very weak. Therefore, they were easily defeated wherever the army went.

It seems simple.

But the disadvantages are also obvious.

There were too many people who rebelled and surrendered, so we had no choice but to keep them.

The result? A lot of problems arose later.

Deng Zhihui was not relieved by Chu He's explanation, but rather became even more angry. He said, "Comrade Chu He, you must remember one thing. Land reform is your responsibility, not the retained staff. You only need to be responsible for the policy, why do you have to consider so many things? Land reform is the basic national policy of New China, and no one, no force, can stop it.

Chu He also got angry when he heard Deng Zhihui's criticism.

He said, "Comrade Deng Zhihui, this is not how we work. You should know that after General Cheng Qian's uprising, many of his troops chose to rebel, but were later dealt with by our 15th Corps. Those troops that did not rebel did not do so because they trusted us, but because they were under the strong pressure of our 15th Corps. However, according to reports from the political cadres we sent to reorganize these troops, many officers in these troops have reactionary ideas. If we do not pay attention to strategy and blindly carry out land reform, these people will inevitably rebel again. If a large-scale rebellion occurs, who will be held responsible for it?"

In other words, the 15th Corps is very powerful.

An army was lent to the Guangxi Military Region to carry out bandit suppression work, and it still has more than 20 troops.

Of the four corps of the Fourth Field Army, the 15th and 16th Corps are the largest and possess the most troops. This is because these two corps are not simply field forces, but are inextricably linked to the second-level military regions under the Northeast Military Region. Therefore, in addition to the three armies under their jurisdiction, they also have a large number of troops directly under the corps.

There were armored divisions, artillery divisions, anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and even several independent divisions moving south together.

Even with such strength as the 15th Corps, it is still cautious in Hunan.

Deng Zhihui saw Chu He's attitude and understood that these cadres from the Fourth and Fifth Field Armies were all unruly and unruly. They were not afraid of him just because he was in charge of the Central South Bureau.

Because most of the Fourth and Fifth Field Armies were from the Eighth Route Army, and later the Northeast Bureau and North China Bureau. Deng Zhihui came from the New Fourth Army and worked in the East China Bureau for a long time during the Liberation War.

Even if we had some connection during the Red Army era, that was twenty years ago. It no longer mattered.

Fortunately, Deng Zhihui is a very capable cadre who has worked for many years.

I've encountered this kind of thing before.

So he suppressed his temper and said, "Comrade Chu He, I know the problems in the provinces are very complicated. But we can't be overly cautious just because the environment is complicated."

This time Chu He didn't say anything.

Chu He is not specifically trying to make things difficult for Deng Zhihui.

Chen Tao, who was sitting at the bottom, said, "Secretary Deng, I want to say a few words."

"Comrade Chen Tao, go ahead."

Among the land reform cadres in various provinces of the Central South Bureau, Chen Tao has little experience and a low rank.

But Chen Tao is the most famous.

Because Chen Tao was the actual operator of the "Shengxian Experience" and was sent by the Central Committee to Guangdong to take charge of land reform after the conflict in the South China Branch, many people looked to Chen Tao.

Chen Tao took out a notebook and said, "I've traveled around Guangdong and had some exchanges with land reform cadres from other provinces. I believe the biggest problem with the current land reform work is the Central South Bureau's guiding ideology. There are very dangerous tendencies within its guiding ideology. If this problem isn't resolved, even if the Central South Bureau completes land reform this year, it will be an unsuccessful effort."

Many people were surprised when Chen Tao opened his mouth.

I think Chen Tao was quite arrogant. The Central South Bureau, the South China Branch, and the Southeast Branch held numerous meetings on the issue of land reform, and the debate was intense. Deng Zhihui, the Second Secretary of the Central South Bureau, had numerous arguments with the cadres in charge of land reform.

But no one dared to say that there was something wrong with the Central South Bureau's guiding ideology for land reform.

The Central South Bureau's guiding ideology for land reform directly pointed to problems with Deng Zhihui, as he was the cadre in charge of land reform in the Central South Bureau.

Deng Zhihui was also quite surprised.

Of all the land reform cadres who had argued with Deng Zhihui, no one had mentioned the guiding principles of land reform. With so many people looking at him, Chen Tao was nervous. After all, this was the Central South Bureau, not the North China Bureau, and there was no Wei Hongjun as a strong support.

But Chen Tao remembered what Wei Hongjun said.

That is, when you arrive at the Central South Bureau, don't interfere in other matters, but be brave enough to maintain pressure on land reform. So Chen Tao continued, "It's the peaceful distribution of land that is the guiding ideology of land reform.

This idea of ​​peacefully distributing land is extremely dangerous. It manifests itself in two ways: First, a purely production-oriented perspective. Currently, a large number of land reform cadres, including those in government departments, hold this view. They believe that land reform is all about distributing land, and that distributing land is all about production.

The absence of conflict and the peaceful division of land are beneficial to production. I even know a member of the Prefectural Party Committee stated at a meeting that New China has now achieved national revolutionary victory, Chiang Kai-shek has been defeated, the main bandit groups have been eliminated, and the landlords are beginning to divide. The next priority is production, so it's best to avoid major conflicts in the countryside that would disrupt subsequent production.

"Second: The results of land reform were considered in a simple, static, and isolated manner. Everyone focused only on the scale of land reform and demanded that the area of ​​land reform be expanded. Reports were all about how many villages and counties had completed land reform. The specific circumstances of the land reform and the situation of the various classes in the countryside were ignored, and only the scope of the land reform was considered. The result of this guiding ideology was that land reform cadres in various places pursued only the fastest possible land distribution, and even compromised with local landlords and clan forces in order to complete the land reform. As long as the local landlords and clan forces were willing to give up land, our cadres would even recognize other privileges held by the landlords and clan forces. They believed that if the landlords and clan forces were willing to give up land, it would mean the beginning of the division of the landlords and clan forces. As a result, our land reform work did not change anything in the countryside except the land.

"Third: Simply and isolatedly emphasizing land law and order. Because our cadres place too much emphasis on law and order, our masses dare not oppose feudalism at all. Because our masses will be considered to be violating the law and order if they take even the slightest excessive action. There is nothing wrong with our cadres emphasizing law and order, because law and order can ensure social stability. However, the result of simply emphasizing law and order without considering the actual situation in the countryside is that the rural masses believe that the cadres of New China are protecting the landlord class and clan forces and recognizing their privileges in the countryside. Because the landlord class and clan forces are most concerned with order.

"Fourth: There was no complete plan for the work, and we only paid attention to the steps, which eventually became a formality. Many of our cadres only emphasized the steps one-sidedly, thinking that as long as the steps were correct, there would be no problem. However, this one-sided emphasis on steps is itself a form of formalism, and in the end, land reform work in various places also became a formality and a formality. Because our leaders and land reform cadres only emphasized the steps one-sidedly, the result was that the rural masses had no enthusiasm for land reform, and they did not dare to step forward to participate in land reform. When I was conducting investigations in various places, I found that the attitude of many farmers was that there was a policy anyway, and whether they stepped forward or not, they would be punished, so why step forward and offend others. Therefore, when land reform meetings were held in the countryside, the masses had no enthusiasm, and the meetings were just formalities.

"These are the four most prominent aspects of the peaceful land distribution ideology that I've compiled. Under the guiding principle of peaceful land distribution, land reform appeared to be underway in various regions, but it was completely perfunctory. It was simply a simple land distribution. This was because our cadres had not grasped the land reform ideologically.

Is our land reform just about dividing up the land? No, our land reform is about overthrowing the feudal land system, not simply dividing up the land. Our land reform is first and foremost an anti-feudal revolution; that's the most important thing. I think many of our cadres have forgotten that land reform is a revolution, not a polite dinner. If the idea of ​​peacefully dividing up the land is not eliminated, our land reform in the Central South Bureau will inevitably become a 'half-cooked meal'.

Chen Tao really conducted a serious investigation into land reform.

After the investigation, Chen Tao was shocked.

The Central South Bureau's land reform work was fraught with serious problems. If the land reforms in Northeast China and North China had shown signs of "leftism," then when Wei Hongjun led the land reform in North China, he formulated policies that were somewhat "rightist" to offset the "leftism" in the land reform.

But the land reform in the Central South Bureau was really too "rightist".

The idea of ​​peaceful land distribution dominated the mainstream.

Many cadres here have forgotten that land reform was a rural revolution.

Compared to the vigorous and enthusiastic land reform movement in the old liberated areas, the current land reform in many provinces of the Central and South Bureau is quite quiet. It seems that the land reform work is going on, but the rural masses have no enthusiasm for it.

This situation was highly abnormal. Before Chen Tao arrived at the South China Branch, he had assumed that the main problem with land reform there was local cadres "obstructing" the work. Luo Qirong and others shared this view. They felt the problem lay with localism, that they were "obstructing" the progress of land reform.

Therefore, before Chen Tao came, he was prepared to crack down on local cadres during the land reform.

However, after investigation and research, Chen Tao discovered that this problem wasn't simply due to "localism" among local officials. While this was a problem, it wasn't the most important issue. The biggest problem with the Central-South Bureau's land reform efforts stemmed from this issue: the guiding ideology of the entire Central-South Bureau's land reform movement. They believed that the entire country had been liberated, and that peaceful land distribution in the countryside was entirely possible. The excesses that occurred during the land reform movements in Northeast and North China could now be avoided.

The result is the current situation.

Instead of mobilizing the masses, the land reform cadres were afraid of both wolves in front and tigers behind.

Without mass participation, the land reform movement had no impact on the feudal problems in the countryside. The landlord class still had many intellectuals, and clan power was still deeply entrenched. The countryside was still under the control of the landlord class and clan power.

Chen Tao knew that his words would inevitably offend many people.

This was particularly true of Deng Zhihui, who was in charge of land reform in the Central South Bureau. Although Deng Zhihui consistently emphasized land reform, Chen Tao believed that Deng Zhihui's own guiding ideology was flawed. Therefore, no matter how much he emphasized the progress of land reform, the Central South Bureau's land reform continued to encounter frequent problems.

Deng Zhihui was the Second Secretary of the Central South Bureau, the Political Commissar of the Central South Military Region, and a member of the Central Committee. He had extensive Party experience and high rank, making him no ordinary person. Yet, Chen Tao bravely spoke out. Although Chen Tao was a cadre of the Central South Bureau, he was actually a cadre of the South China Branch.

As long as the South China Branch has Luo Qirong's support, the Central South Bureau will not have much to do with Chen Tao.

Furthermore, Chen Tao was an experienced rural cadre. As a Party member, he couldn't just sit there and watch the Central South Bureau's land reform face such a serious problem. This was a matter of concern to 100 million people across seven provinces in the Central South Bureau.

So he knew he had offended Deng Zhihui, but he still said it out loud.

Chapter 779 Correction

Chen Tao fired a shot at the Central South Bureau's land reform meeting.

The target is directly Deng Zhihui.

After Chen Tao finished speaking, the meeting hall fell silent for a short while. Everyone was considering Chen Tao's words, and some even began to wonder whether this was Chen Tao's intention or the intention of Wei Hongjun, who was currently in charge of the national land reform.

Even Deng Zhihui couldn't help but think of Wei Hongjun.

Many land reform cadres attended the meeting. Several people came from each province, many of whom were from Northeast China and North China. This was because, with the exception of Henan, the Central South Bureau was entirely territory conquered by the Fourth and Fifth Field Armies.

When the central government transferred cadres from the old liberated areas, many of them were actually from their original units. Therefore, many of the local cadres here were from Northeast China and North China.

Many of them were not doing land reform work for the first time, but after they came to the Central-South Bureau, they were somewhat restrained in the land reform.

At first, everyone assumed it was due to the overpowering "localism" here. It was precisely because the local cadres' "localism" was hindering them from carrying out their work that their work was stalled. But following Chen Tao's words, everyone began to re-examine the Central South Bureau's land reform. They began to realize that the reason they had been so hesitant to implement land reform here was because the guiding spirit of the reform was flawed.

The guiding spirit of the Central South Bureau was indeed the idea of ​​"peaceful distribution of land."

Under the guidance of this ideology, how could the land reform cadres carry out the land reform with unfettered hands? The Central South Bureau has always been against "localism", especially against "localism" in Guangdong.

Deng Zhihui also presided over several meetings to criticize "localism".