Technology invades the modern world

Chapter 320 Lin Ran's Role

"Mr. President, gentlemen, the professor's proposal, in summary, hopes to use your domestic political pressure as leverage. The party division and low public opinion have put you on the verge of stepping down, which in turn allows you to appear unscrupulous on the international stage."

By simulating nuclear alert, such as sending B-52s close to the Soviet border and hinting at escalating the Vietnam War through diplomatic channels, we created uncertainty.

From the Ministry of National Defense's perspective, this is not a blind adventure, but a realistic calculation based on reciprocal deterrence.

Our intelligence indicates that although Soviet aid to North Vietnam accounted for 70% of its logistical support, their global strategic priority was European stability and arms control, and they were unwilling to jeopardize their 'peaceful coexistence' with us because of the Vietnam War.

Your domestic situation, with a low approval rating of 35% and internal party divisions, has ironically become an advantage: it has convinced Moscow that you are free from political constraints and can escalate the situation regardless of the consequences.

This could force them to work together to pressure Hanoi for a short-term ceasefire, without us having to send an additional 10 troops.

The risks are manageable; simulated B-52 alert exercises only require a few days of preparation, and history, as demonstrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, shows that such uncertainty often leads to concessions from adversaries.

Of course, we need to closely monitor their responses to avoid misjudgment.

The professor's ideas aren't just wild fantasies; they're based on precise calculations of reality. He has proven his insightful understanding of diplomacy and defense countless times in the past, and I have absolute faith in his judgment!

After McNamara finished speaking, he added, "Just like when you used paper airplanes to humiliate Kosygin in the past, and he tolerated it, it's the same logic behind it. The Soviet Union was more afraid of going to war than we were."

Data and logic—that's McNamara's style.

At this time, Soviet Russia also had its own geopolitical dilemmas to worry about, the most important of which were tensions on its southern border and stability in Europe.

Obviously, not everyone will fall for this tactic.

Rusk, however, said with concern: “Mr. President, I respect the professor’s analysis, but it is too close to brinkmanship. Soviet Russia’s Leonard is pushing for limited sovereignty and maintaining control in Eastern Europe. If we bluff, they may see it as a provocation.”

Recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis, we had the intelligence advantage then; now, the Vietnam War is being aided from their backyard. We've already had initial contact in the Paris negotiations, so why not strengthen coordination through diplomatic channels? Creating an image of 'madness' is likely to backfire and make our allies question us.

At this time, the allies were not as obedient as they would be in later generations, and France still possessed a certain degree of autonomy.

Rusk held a conservative view of Lin Ran's suggestions.

Because Dean Rusk had long since given up on the job.

Last year, Rusk submitted his resignation because his daughter married a black NASA employee, but it was rejected. However, this did not change his mind that he really did not want to continue working there.

Wouldn't it be better to go back to university to teach and write a Cold War memoir? "My Life in the White House"—money and free time, wouldn't that be wonderful?

As the former chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation, Rusk's life has truly been fulfilling, except for never having served as president.

One example of his class is that during the Vietnam War, Dean Rusk's son, Richard Rusk, was studying political science at Cornell University.

He would bring his Cornell classmates home; everyone he knew at Cornell was against the war. They would come to Washington to attend large anti-war rallies, and they would often stay at Rusk's house.

When Dean Rusk saw them coming downstairs, he would say, “Okay, guys, welcome to the house, but you’d better put the sign on the umbrella stand by the front door.”

Rusk has now realized that the Vietnam War was a mistake, and he has a retirement mentality, preferring to avoid trouble.

If he were to actually come up with some crazy theory, he, as Secretary of State, would have to become a frequent flyer, constantly traveling between London, Paris, Geneva, and Washington. He's almost out of office, so why bother making things worse?
And what if things actually go wrong?
Rusk's brinkmanship policy, in layman's terms, is about walking a tightrope.

Rusk was probably the only one of the four who resolutely opposed any crazy theories.

After he finished speaking, he even thought to himself how heartbroken his son, Richard Rusk, would be if he knew that the professor had come up with such an idea.

McNamara rubbed his forehead, a sense of weariness flashing through his mind as he reviewed the war statistics: hundreds of casualties every week, and a ballooning budget deficit.

What he didn't know was that this number would soon balloon.

"The Ministry of Defense's assessment shows that the S-75 missiles provided by the Soviet Union to North Vietnam have effectively countered our bombing, but their global strategy is to avoid direct confrontation."

If the Soviet Union could provide unlimited aid, and China could prevent us from crossing the 17th parallel north, then we must also create our own bargaining chips from outside.

Otherwise, we will never achieve our goals, and we won't even be able to gradually withdraw from North Vietnam; we will likely face a crushing defeat!

McNamara paused, then added, "The Department of Defense's ability to maintain strict control over the entire process can certainly be used as a bargaining chip."

He hadn't spoken with Lin Ran, but he had already keenly sensed that Lin Ran was creating trading chips out of thin air.

Aside from being utterly incompetent in battlefield command, McNamara was an absolute elite in every other respect.

Rostow was much more proactive. He opened his memo and pointed to the data on Soviet aid: "Gentlemen, we cannot ignore the geopolitical realities."

The split between Soviet Russia and the East has already caused their transportation delays. If we show resolve, they will calculate the costs; aiding North Vietnam is far less important than the nuclear risk threatening their homeland.

The professor's idea has a theoretical basis: a linkage policy that could link the Vietnam War with arms control.

The threat of the president's resignation was indeed leverage, making Moscow feel that you had nothing to lose, thus prompting them to act as intermediaries.

Rostow was optimistic: this would strengthen America's containment stance and prevent the defeat in the Vietnam War from affecting its Asian allies.

Rostow's full name was Walt Whitman Rostow, and he was probably one of the first White House officials to see through the Soviet Union's bullying and cowardly nature.

Between 1951 and 1952, Rostow took on a project called the Study of the Weaknesses of Soviet Russia.

Sponsored by the CIS and with strong support from the White House, the project aimed to identify weaknesses in Soviet Russia's political and psychological warfare capabilities and benefited from contributions from top Soviet Russia experts and psychological warfare specialists.

Rostow then led a group of staunch Cold War fighters known as the Quantico Weakness Group, who published a report advocating for nuclear coercion against the Soviet Union.

The sponsor behind these experts was Nelson Rockefeller.

The key points in this report had a direct impact on the subsequent Cold War.

It listed a sequence of proposals from easy to difficult, attempting to test the true intentions of Soviet Russia in this way.

Recommendations include:

"The push for German unification was seen as a test of Soviet Russia's sincerity, and was considered a key factor in testing Soviet Russia's concessions."

They encouraged the independence of the satellite states in Eastern Europe, believing that the discontent of these satellite states was a weakness and a bleeding point for Soviet Russia.

It emphasized economic aid and military deterrence in Asia, aimed to sow discord between China and Soviet Russia, and transformed Asian countries from a major problem for the free world into an asset, significantly increasing investment in underdeveloped Asian countries.

Indeed, the views expressed in this report were completed in 1952 and published in 1955.
In addition, in 1947 he became the assistant to the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe and participated in the development of the Marshall Plan.

In early 1946, Rostow realized that German unification was impossible without European unification, and that the best way to achieve European unification was through technical cooperation in the economic field, rather than through direct diplomatic negotiations.

Rostow's writings on European economic unity caught the attention of then-Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and eventually the attention of French diplomat Jean Monnet. Subsequently, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, and Jean Monnet is hailed as the father of the European Economic Community.

It was this top-notch geopolitical manipulator who, after reading Lin Ran's proposal, realized that it was the only solution.

To be more precise, creating cards out of thin air was the only way to resolve the Vietnam War without losing face.

"I absolutely support the professor's proposal. This strategy not only aligns with my understanding of Soviet Russia, but also means that Soviet Russia would absolutely not dare to escalate the situation."

Furthermore, since the professor had never failed before, and we had not done well in the Vietnam War, we had no reason not to adopt the professor's proposal.

The hotline has already amply demonstrated the professor's talent in diplomacy; he is so gifted and so adept at discerning the essence of matters.

Our current dilemma lies in our lack of leverage to pressure the Soviet Union into negotiations, and our lack of motivation to compel the Soviet Union to urge South Vietnam to act. A world-ending nuclear war, however, is the most powerful leverage available!

After Rostow finished speaking, his face was resolute and his eyes were incredibly determined, giving Lyndon Johnson a clear signal.

A faint apology rose in his mind, an apology directed at Humphrey.

Before the meeting, Humphrey gave him a strict order: in this small meeting, you must do everything you can to get Lyndon Johnson to push forward the professor's proposal and promote the application of the Madman's Theory.

why?
In Humphrey's view, Lyndon Johnson was already a dead man and not worth mentioning. McCarthy and Wallace seemed to be coming on strong, but that was only now. Once he entered the election, he would sweep them into the dustbin of history like a plow sweeping away a pit.

The only person who could threaten his entry into the White House was Nixon. Fred was a clown, so the madman theory and Nixon's arguments for solving the Vietnam War coincided.

It's just that Nixon wanted to do this in the future, and he couldn't make it clear in advance. If he did, the Soviet Union would know, and it would be useless to do it then.

It was only after reading Lin Ran's proposal that Humphrey realized where Nixon's information in the interview and his confidence in resolving the Vietnam War came from—wasn't it just madman's theory?
If the White House uses this tactic first, it won't be Nixon's trump card; instead, it will become a bleeding point for the opposing side during the televised debate.

Therefore, Humphrey pleaded with Rostow to persuade Lyndon Johnson.

The fact that Vice President Humphrey was absent from such an important event suggests that Lyndon Johnson had developed a grudge against him, and that Johnson had seen through his ambitions.

Clifford leaned back in his chair, his gaze sweeping over the crowd as he weighed the legal risks in his mind: as a lawyer, he was considering it from an international law perspective. "Mr. President, this is a high-risk gamble."

Domestically, Congress and the media would view it as reckless; internationally, the United Nations or allies might condemn it.

However, if we base our actions on intelligence and conduct simulated exercises without actually escalating them, it might work.

The key was secrecy and controllability, keeping the Soviet Union worried without triggering a chain reaction.

Johnson listened, his hands clasped together, his thoughts racing: everyone present had their points; Rusk's caution was typical of the State Department; McNamara's support reflected his unconditional obedience to the professor; and Rostow's optimism stemmed from his hawkish views.

With his approval rating at rock bottom and McCarthy's 10% support within the party a constant threat, why not use his weakness to turn it into strength?
However, escalating nuclear deterrence could cause the Cold War to spiral out of control and affect the global balance.

In such situations, the professor's myth of invincibility played a decisive role. To this day, every year during the Nobel Prize ceremony, the media digs out and comments on each Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Regardless of the perspective, Lin Ran's Nobel Peace Prize in 1961 for his work on the hotline is considered one of the most prestigious peace awards.

To this day, it continues to play a role in critical matters.

Lyndon Johnson finally spoke: "Thank you, everyone."

This is not a hasty decision. We need more intelligence assessment, McNamara and Rostow, to prepare detailed plans, including potential Soviet responses.

The meeting is now adjourned.

Everyone present agreed, knowing that Lyndon Johnson was going all in.

This was also the opponent's last-ditch effort.

If this fails, the opponent will undoubtedly lose the presidential election this year.

Now he is trying to seize this glimmer of hope.

Inside the room, everyone stood up, their footsteps echoing down the corridor. Johnson sat alone for a moment, staring at the map, his mind still unsettled: Was this really the key to ending the war?

However, things didn't go according to the script the White House had prepared. They had originally wanted to be fully prepared before implementing the madman's theory.

But on January 30, 1968, North Vietnam's Tet Offensive swept in like a sudden storm.

North Vietnam launched a large-scale offensive, attacking Saigon, Hue and several American bases, and even briefly stormed the American embassy.

In the White House Analyst Room, intelligence from the front lines was piling up.

President Lyndon Johnson stood before the map, his face grim, staring at the live television footage on the screen: burning streets, fallen soldiers, and news anchor Walter Cronkite's somber report: "This offensive proves the stalemate in the war."

Although the offensive was militarily repelled, it resulted in over 4000 American casualties and, through media coverage of the American homeland, caused Lyndon Johnson's approval rating to plummet to 26%, with anti-war sentiment within the party as strong as McCarthy's.

This was not merely a battlefield defeat, but a geopolitical turning point: North Vietnam's resilience depended on Soviet aid, while the offensive exposed America's vulnerability. If it did not retaliate, the credibility of the Cold War would collapse, giving the Soviet Union an even greater advantage.

We are now in an unprecedentedly dangerous situation, causing war polls to plummet, leading to compromises and a minor collapse of the Cold War.

Therefore, in the analysis room, Lyndon Johnson wished he could stab McNamara in the back. If you hadn't personally intervened, would we be in this predicament today?
Lyndon Johnson convened an emergency meeting. On the table in the Oval Office were two sets of materials: Gallup poll data and an assessment of Soviet aid.

"Gentlemen," Johnson began, his voice hoarse and weary, "the Lunar New Year offensive has caused us heavy losses."

Domestically, anti-war activists are marching in the streets, and even Democrats are beginning to shift their stance during the congressional budget debates.

Soviet Russia was the mastermind behind it all; they aided Hanoi but were unwilling to get directly involved. We can't afford to proceed slowly any longer; the professor's proposal must be implemented immediately.

Lin Ran was among them. He nodded and said, "Mr. President, the reality after the offensive is our leverage."

Your approval ratings have plummeted, and the party split has dashed your hopes of re-election, which ironically allows you to appear more uninhibited on the international stage.

By simulating nuclear alert, we create uncertainty, and believe me, the Kremlin will rationally calculate the costs.

"We want them to think the White House is crazy, thereby pressuring North Vietnam to implement a short-term ceasefire in exchange for our cooperation on arms control."

McNamara said, "It's time."

Lascaux sighed helplessly.

Rostow replied, "Mr. President, we have no time to hesitate any longer!"

They exchanged glances.

Finally, Lyndon Johnson took a deep breath and made up his mind: the onslaught had left him with no choice. This was not recklessness, but a helpless choice. By turning the tables and turning the tables, he might be able to force Moscow to mediate.

This time, it wasn't Lin Ran saying that he never fails, but rather Lyndon Johnson silently praying that this promise would come true.

Professor, if your invincible record is broken, I'll have no choice but to slink off the stage in disgrace.

“Alright, let’s do it. Professor, you will go to Geneva as the special envoy to discuss this. We’ll start by initiating deterrence.”

In mid-February, the United States began applying maximum pressure.

The Ministry of Defense ordered B-52 bombers to conduct simulated nuclear alert exercises over the Pacific Ocean, with the route intentionally approaching the Soviet/Russian Far East border and radar signals intentionally leaked.

Johnson's public remarks, which implied that "all options are on the table" without explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons, have stirred up diplomatic channels.

Soviet diplomatic protests followed, but intelligence indicated that Moscow was beginning to assess the risks: Leonard was unwilling to take risks with Vietnam, especially since the North Vietnamese offensive, though bold, had exposed logistical limitations.

Lin Ran arrived in Geneva in early March.

The early spring scenery in Geneva did little to ease the tensions of the negotiations.

Kosygin was sent to Geneva to meet Lin Ran; he was a moderate among the three leading figures of Soviet Russia at the time.

I was supposed to talk to Lyndon Johnson in Gettysburg last year.

Of course, the Soviet Union sent Kosygin to talk with Lin Ran, which was already the treatment of a Secretary of State or a President.

If the White House had sent a general plenipotentiary, even Rostow, the Soviet Union would have at most sent Kuznetsov to negotiate.

Kosygin looked very tired, clearly exhausted by the recent sudden tension in the nuclear deterrence situation.

“Mr. Kosygin,” Lin Ran began, “the situation after the Spring Festival offensive is irreversible.”

The president’s domestic pressures, including a collapse in public opinion and challenges within his party, have left him without political constraints.

If North Vietnam does not concede, we will consider extreme options. This is not a threat, but a reality: Soviet aid is sustaining the resistance in Hanoi, but the risk of escalation threatens everyone, and the president is nearly insane.

You know Lyndon Johnson better than I do; you know what kind of person he is.

As Kosygin listened to the fluent Russian, his thoughts drifted away from the negotiations. Had it not been for the sunlight and architectural style outside, he would have thought he was in a meeting in the Kremlin.

Kosygin lit a cigarette, weighing his options: America's intimidation was most likely a bluff, but Johnson's predicament was very real.

The offensive demonstrated North Vietnam's determination, but it also exhausted its resources.

If Johnson were truly driven mad and the situation spiraled out of control, could the Soviet Union really afford such a price?

The weakness of Soviet Russia was laid bare at this time.

Just as Rostow and Lyndon Johnson watched the departing plane together at the airport after Lin Ran left Washington on his private jet, he said quietly, "Mr. President, believe me, the Soviet Union will definitely compromise!"

A moment later he repeated, "Definitely! Not compromising is not the mark of a Soviet citizen."

Kosygin responded: "Professor, we support North Vietnam's self-defense, but peace is in our common interest."

We can push for Paris contact to induce a ceasefire in Hanoi, but on the condition that America commits to withdrawing its troops and not interfering in Eastern Europe.

The negotiations were not so simple; the entire process lasted a full fifteen days.

Lin Ran's cable to the White House stated: "They are beginning to soften their stance, the offensive is making the Kremlin calculate the costs, and our pressure is working."

Subsequently, the Kremlin made the final decision to urge Hanoi to cease fire.

Representatives from both sides jointly signed a one-year ceasefire agreement in Geneva.

(End of this chapter)