Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

Slava's biggest concern is the SDI issue:

"The core of the October summit will inevitably be SDI. I am almost certain that Reagan will not compromise on SDI, and we cannot sign any nuclear arms reduction agreement without SDI being unconstrained."

Therefore, I can say that this summit will most likely end in failure, and we must ensure its failure.

Ligachev frowned, because so far the moderate reformists had not reached a consensus on this issue:

“Ivanov, the military and I would like it to fail, but Comrade Ryzhkov would like it to succeed.”

The moderate reformists are not a monolithic group; many in the Politburo support a successful negotiation.

First, it was General Secretary Gorbachev who proposed the motion.

Then there was Yakovlev, the propaganda minister of the Central Committee, a radical Western liberal, the chief architect of openness, and the number two figure among radical reformers.

There's also Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, whose current role in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is similar to that of a tigress, but whose actual status is comparable to that of a border tigress. There's no need to pay attention to him; Gorbachev just wants to use this meeting to elevate his status.

As a technocrat and reformist, Prime Minister Ryzhkov is more concerned with economic efficiency and has no objection to cutting military spending to boost the economy.

There is also alternate member Medvedev, a theorist newly discovered by Gorbachev, who currently lacks a power base.

On the other hand, there were many more people who opposed it, including Zaykov, who represented the military-industrial complex, as well as Second Secretary Ligachev, KGB Chairman Chebrikov, Defense Minister Solomyantsev, and Head of State Gromyko.

Slava wanted to first understand what consensus everyone was on in opposing the movement. This consensus was crucial, as it was an important prerequisite for preventing Gorbachev from defeating them one by one.

"Let's start with the military's position. I would like to ask the military comrades to confirm whether I am correct."

The representative sent by Ogarkov was a lieutenant general from the General Staff, who nodded to signal Slava to continue.

"The Soviet Union's nuclear deterrence mindset was rooted in the 'mutually assured destruction' framework established after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the ABM Treaty of 1972 further institutionalized it."

Both sides must be reliably vulnerable—because vulnerability creates mutual deterrence, and deterrence ensures stability. And as far as I know, the SDI has never been a defensive weapon within the General Staff—it's the final piece of the puzzle for NATO offense.

He arranged teacups and sunflower seed shells on the table to form a diagram, with the teacups representing missile silos and the sunflower seed shells representing the SDI interception system.

"Even if SDI had only a 30% interception rate, it would be enough to undermine the credibility of a Soviet retaliatory second nuclear strike—because the United States could preemptively destroy most of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the remaining few would be intercepted by SDI, making the damage to the U.S. mainland manageable."

That means we can't guarantee that we'll destroy each other, right?

The lieutenant general took over the conversation. He was very familiar with this analysis, because it was the conclusion of the General Staff Operations Bureau's war game simulations:

"Marshal Ogarkov clearly stated in his September report to the Politburo that if the United States deploys even the first-generation SDI, we must have a complete symmetric response within three to five years, otherwise our second-strike capability will drop from the current 95% confidence level to no more than 60%!"

This is the bottom line for the survival of the Soviet Union; we must not compromise on it.

“Yes,” Slava said, “so the military can’t compromise on SDI. If the Americans successfully deploy SDI, then we must respond in kind. But the problem is—”

He paused and looked at Ryzhkov.

"Do we have the money to do this symmetrical response?"

"I regret to inform you, comrades, that the alliance is out of money."

Ryzhkov knew better than anyone else present about the Soviet Union's current financial situation.

"Our defense spending already accounts for 15% of our GDP, and the military's symmetric response SDI program is estimated to require an additional 150 to 200 billion rubles over ten to fifteen years—equivalent to adding another 10% to our already overloaded defense spending."

He slammed the teacup down on the table.

"If we are forced to follow the US and pour money into SDI symmetric response—then everything we've been working so hard on this year—informatization, light industry, agricultural modernization... will have to stop!"

There was a few seconds of silence in the room, then Slava played his cards:

“Back in Andropov’s time, I said that SDI was technically infeasible for most of the time.”

Everyone looked at him.

"I had the KGB team analyze all the publicly available technical information and intelligence about SDI that they could get their hands on—their conclusion was that there were many unresolved problems in the physical principles of SDI's core components, especially the nuclear-powered X-ray laser interception system."

The first-generation system cannot achieve combat capability within twenty years! This conclusion is consistent with the assessment of the Anti-SDI Committee led by Verikhov and Saghdeyev of the USSR Academy of Sciences; I believe their report has already been submitted to the General Secretary.

The military lieutenant general nodded: "We have read the report from the Velikhov Committee. Technically, their arguments are solid; SDI will not have the capability to intercept a large-scale missile salvo in the foreseeable future."

“Then the problem becomes clear,” Slava said. “We are facing a cognitive dilemma: if the scientists are right and SDI is bragging, we can ignore it.”

If the scientists were wrong, even partially wrong, the Soviet Union would have fallen behind by 15 to 20 years.

The costs of mistakes are completely asymmetrical, and under such asymmetry, any rational decision-maker would choose to treat it as a real threat—that's why Gorbachev was so determined to fight SDI, because he couldn't afford to gamble.

"So you mean we should gamble?" Ligachev asked.

"No. What I mean is—we shouldn't let the success or failure of this summit depend on SDI, something we can't afford to gamble on or give up."

This was Slava's true strategy, which he then laid out in its entirety.

"This is an excellent opportunity to get all reformers to a consensus before the summit: the success of this meeting is not measured by whether or not a signature is made, but by the level of credibility established."

We must prove to the West that the Soviet delegation is capable and willing to make substantial concessions—but we will not concede recklessly on issues that undermine national security.

This impression is more valuable than any specific terms. Having the General Secretary go with the mindset of 'I must avoid this,' rather than 'I must bring back this,' significantly reduces the risk of him impulsively signing on the spot.

At this point, Director Nian interjected, "I'll handle this one. I'll talk to Yakovlev. Yakovlev is in the propaganda business; he understands the value of 'impressions' better than anyone. He should be able to accept this approach."

Moreover, it's more convincing for him to propose it than for us moderates to do so—ha, so we don't get accused of being conservatives pouring cold water on the summit.

Slava nodded and continued: "Second, the military's red line cannot be shaken and must be put on the General Secretary's table before the summit!"

I know Gorbachev well. If all the other proposals at this summit can be passed and only the SDI issue gets stuck, then there is a high probability that he will make concessions on his own. In that case, NATO can deploy the SDI, while we will withdraw and destroy our weapons for no reason. How can that be allowed?

Ogarkov's people must be asked to give a special explanation to the General Secretary before the summit, clearly explaining why SDI is non-negotiable.

This way, the General Secretary would know at the negotiating table that if he made concessions on SDI, he would not only lose political support, but the military would also never side with him!

The military lieutenant general noted in his notebook: "Okay, I will pass it on to the Marshal. In fact, Comrade Ogarkov has always advocated not yielding an inch on the SDI issue—he will send Marshal Akhromeyev to lead the Arms Control Working Group at this summit."

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev was the first deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, the most important figure in the Ministry of Defense, and a negotiator acceptable to both the conservative and reformist factions within the military.

At this time, Ogarkov was promoting a large number of reformist generals, such as Dmitry Yazov, commander of the Central Asian Military District, and General Vladimir Lobov, a young and promising general in the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff with a modern strategic vision...

These military reformers have long recognized that the existing military economic model is unsustainable, and they are all willing to accept a quality-for-quantity strategy if the Americans make concessions on SDI—although this is absolutely impossible—both military reformers and conservatives are willing to sign a treaty.

The military's biggest fear was that Gorbachev would make concessions! This ultimately allowed the Americans to deploy SDI normally, but the Soviet Union had to spend a lot of money on countermeasures, and it was this point that brought the military to a consensus.

“Very good, third—” Slava looked at Director Nian, “We will use our channels to give advance notice to our Western European friends, such as West Germany, Italy, and Denmark: the Soviet Union may accept ‘zeroing out European intermediate-range missiles’ at this summit.”

Director Nian raised an eyebrow.

"If Western European governments had known in advance that the Soviet Union was willing to remove all intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe, they would have put pressure on the United States after the summit to separate the issue of European intermediate-range missiles from the SDI negotiations."

For Western Europe, removing the SS20 missiles that were targeting them would be a huge benefit. They would not allow the United States to destroy an intermediate-range missile agreement that would allow them to sleep soundly for the sake of an SDI missile that was still in the laboratory!

In this way, even if this summit collapses due to SDI, the European intermediate-range missile agreement can be preserved separately for future signing.

"Brilliant! Using Western Europe to loosen the US's negotiating stance, this is a good move!" Director Nian commented. "Western Europe originally wanted the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement, we just told them what they wanted in advance so they could put pressure on the US."

"Fourth," Slava said, the last point, "protect Marshal Akhromeyev."

The people in the guesthouse were taken aback; this point seemed to have no direct relation to the summit itself.

"After the summit, regardless of the outcome, Marshal Akhromeyev, as the Soviet host of the arms control working group, will certainly make some concessions—such as the verification system and reduction ratios."

As far as I know, Gorbachev's push to destroy missiles and nuclear warheads was to invite the Americans to send special envoys to investigate. Damn it, this is the first time in decades since the Soviet Army was founded that the Americans have come to our missile bases to supervise the destruction of our nuclear warheads!

If this had happened during Brezhnev's era, and Gorbachev had dared to propose such a traitorous treaty in the morning, he could have been sent to meet his mentor trembling with fear by the afternoon. It would be strange if the military conservatives had tolerated it!

It is foreseeable that the conservatives in the military will suspect that he has made too many concessions and betrayed the interests of the army. We must protect him after the summit and get the General Secretary and Yakovlev to endorse him.

After all, Akhromeyev is the most crucial link between the military reformists and the political reformists; if he is removed by the conservatives, the alliance between the military and the reformists will be broken. The consequences of this broken alliance—”

Slava paused. He had intended to say, "The consequence of this alliance breaking down is that August 819, 1991, will come earlier than expected," but he couldn't say it.

"The consequences will be severe; a reform regime that loses the support of the military cannot stand firm."

The lieutenant general in the military became much more serious when he heard this: "I will definitely convey this to the Marshal and Comrade Ogarkov. A man like the Marshal deserves to be protected."

PS: Akhromeyev was a good man. In the original history, he later became Gorbachev's military advisor. Three days after the failed August 19, 1991 coup attempt, he committed suicide in his Kremlin office. His suicide note read:

"I cannot bear to see everything I have served my entire life destroyed."

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Reykjavik, Iceland, October 21, 1986

The talks were held at the Hofddi House, a white wooden house built in 1909 that originally belonged to the French consulate and stands alone on the Reykjavik waterfront.

Icelandic legend says the house is haunted, but there was no better place to stay—Gorbachev launched a surprise attack without giving the US and the Soviet Union time to prepare, so they had no choice but to accept these temporary accommodations.

The accommodations were extremely meager; the delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union had to share a single toilet, as there was only one toilet in the entire building.

One of the most solemn moments in the diplomatic history of the Cold War took place in a place where even toilets were scarce.

At 10:30 a.m., Reagan and Gorbachev held a private meeting in a small conference room on the second floor of the Kofdy House, with only the interpreter present.

Gorbachev cut to the chase, presenting a comprehensive plan he had prepared beforehand:

Strategic nuclear weapons to be halved: both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles by 50% within five years, and then eliminate them completely within ten years. European intermediate-range missiles to be eliminated: all intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe to be removed, with each side retaining 100 in Asia. Strict adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: both sides commit to not withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty within ten years, and SDI research limited to laboratory settings. Nuclear tests: both sides negotiate and sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

During the second round of talks in the afternoon, the two sides worked out these four areas one by one. The core point of contention quickly narrowed down to one point—whether SDI should be restricted to the laboratory.

Reagan insisted that SDI was defensive and that he was even willing to share the technology with the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev didn't believe a word of it.

The problem is that the locals actually believe this thing is just a defensive weapon!

After Reagan left office, his diaries, private letters, and repeated explanations to his staff all proved that he truly viewed SDI as a moral project: to make nuclear deterrence obsolete and replace “mutually assured destruction” with defense.

He proposed sharing SDI technology with the Soviet Union, which he believed was in accordance with the principles of propriety. Since defensive systems are moral, then spreading such a moral shield is also moral!

Reagan's integrity did not represent the integrity of others in the United States; the CIA, the Department of Scientific Research, the military-industrial complex, and Commissioner Smith all had their own ulterior motives.

Therefore, if there is anyone who wasn't lying about SDI, it can only be Reagan.

But key figures around Reagan, such as CIA Director William Casey, Secretary of Defense Kasper Weinberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Pearl, all used SDI as a tool in the economic war against the Soviet Union.

Casey explicitly stated that "accelerating the collapse of the Soviet economy through SDI pressure" was a strategic objective. Between 1983 and 1986, he repeatedly said privately, "We can afford it, they can't." Weinberg also stated in a 1985 memo to Reagan:

"Even partial deployment of SDI would force Soviet resources to be diverted to defense, thereby weakening their offensive capabilities."

They did not fabricate the existence of SDI; they merely exploited the Soviet Union's cognitive biases, making a project whose technological reality was far lower than advertised appear in the Soviet Union's eyes as a threat that required a symmetrical response.

The truth revealed by Slava through the KGB investigation further illustrates the absurdity of SDI's claims. Edward Taylor, as the father of the American hydrogen bomb, championed the X-ray laser, a signature technology of SDI. The system's design principle was to use a single nuclear explosion to drive multiple X-ray laser beams, simultaneously intercepting thousands of incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles.

P.S.: The X-ray laser project is called Excalibur, yes, that's the EX curry stick (laughs).

The national laboratory reported a large amount of data on underground nuclear tests that were deliberately exaggerated by scientists. In 1987, chief scientist Roy Woodruff testified before Congress, accusing Taylor of submitting false reports to the White House. An investigation by the Government Accountability Office confirmed that the test data was selectively disclosed. The X-ray laser project was officially canceled in 1992, and all research expenditures of approximately $16 billion were lost.

In other words, many of SDI's core components involve academic fraud at the technical level, and are purely for the purpose of defrauding funding!

Moreover, the military-industrial complex would not allow Reagan to cancel this massive project, with SDI's total budget at approximately $260 billion. This money flowed to military contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and Rockwell.

These military-industrial complexes have a strong incentive to maintain SDI's political legitimacy through lobbying, think tank reports, media cooperation... in short, they cannot cancel the project.

The further the project progressed, the more people tied themselves to it professionally, financially, and in terms of reputation. By 1986, SDI had become a self-sustaining political and economic ecosystem.

Even if the person in the village woke up one day and wanted to cancel it, they simply couldn't.

For the Soviet Union, the SDI internal documents that the KGB could obtain were mostly contractor proposals and Pentagon optimistic assessments—which were precisely the most exaggerated versions!

The Soviets could not obtain the internal memos from those who genuinely doubted the feasibility of SDI, such as some scientists and analysts in the Ministry of Defense.

No one needs to lie; the system itself can create lies.

In terms of actual results, SDI successfully performed all the functions of strategic deception.

Its deceptiveness stems from a president who genuinely believes in it, a group of hawks who strategically instrumentalize it, a group of scientists who engage in technological fraud, a self-reinforcing military-industrial complex, and an adversary intelligence system whose facade cannot be penetrated.

------

At 5:40 p.m., Reagan and Gorbachev decided to hand over the negotiations to the working group for overnight discussions.

The arms control team was chaired by Akhromeyev and Paul Nietzsche from the US side. Yes, he's an old friend of ours again. He was the one who came during the Geneva negotiations. This old diplomat, who has lived since the Truman era, is still going strong.

Akhromeyev sat at the negotiating table and laid out the true data of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, endorsed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army.

This was the first time the West had seen the Soviet General Staff report numbers directly without the Party's approval.

The negotiations proceeded one by one throughout the night: on the strategic nuclear weapons front, the Soviet military agreed to target 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles.

Regarding the European intermediate-range missile program, the Soviet Union had previously insisted on including the nuclear weapons of Britain and France in its calculations, but Akhromeyev conceded that night.

Akhromeyev also accepted the verification system, which allowed American inspectors to enter Soviet territory to verify the destruction of missiles. This was something that generations of the Soviet military had considered off-limits. A Soviet marshal had, overnight, relinquished the wall that the army had held most firmly for over seventy years.

The Soviet Union only needed the Americans to give up SDI.

Nietzsche's later recollection of Akhromeyev's words has been repeatedly quoted:

"He's a top-notch negotiator. He's tough, but he's working hard to reach an agreement."

Communism is a flawed system, destined to fail, but I believe Sergei Akhromeyev was a man of courage and character. If anyone could help the Soviet Union achieve its best ambitions, it was him! He was a good man in a bad system.