Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

Within this framework, all of the Soviet Union's problems could be reduced to "encirclement and subversion by imperialism," and the solution was to strengthen the Party's leadership, strengthen ideological education, and strengthen military power.

The second group came from the radical reformers in the Gorbachev-Yakovlev camp. They wanted to introduce concepts such as democratization, openness and transparency, and humane democratic socialism into the party program, shifting the direction of Soviet reforms from improving the existing system to "fundamental institutional changes."

The third option, which ultimately became dominant, came from the proposals of moderate reformers.

Ligachev, as the second secretary, was in charge of ideological work and was directly responsible for finalizing the new party program.

Under the influence of Slava and Ryzhkov, Ligachev defined the core statement of the party program as "improving the socialist system".

This is exactly what moderate reformers want to hear: acknowledging the flaws in the existing system and the need for improvement, with the goal of making socialism function better rather than abandoning socialism and moving towards capitalism.

As for the construction of communism?

It was postponed indefinitely, and the party program no longer set any specific timetable to predict when communism would arrive.

Now, the Soviet Union has finally officially acknowledged that Khrushchev's 1961 promise was an empty promise. It took the Soviet Union 25 years to finally find a dignified way to tear up that promise without having to publicly admit that it was just a boast.

"Further democratization of society and deepening of socialist autonomy of the people" was written into the Party's main tasks, a product of compromise between the Ligachev and Gorbachev camps.

Ligachev's understanding was to expand grassroots participation under the leadership of the Party, while Gorbachev's understanding was the structural openness of the political system.

The same sentence can be interpreted in two ways, and they will inevitably clash someday. Gorbachev is currently on the front line, but he will eventually cross it.

What will Ligachev do on that day? What will the CPSU do? Who will the people choose?

Everyone will provide an answer.

Chapter 58 Return to Moscow (1 words)

The crisis has passed; it's time to return to the center.

February 1986 was the 2th Congress of the CPSU. At this congress, Gorbachev would inevitably try to do something new, nothing more than openness and rejuvenation. This was a good opportunity.

Slava began collecting his ammunition.

At that time, the information technology infrastructure had been operating for nearly a year in the three pilot regions of Poltava, Vinnytsia, and Kirovograd in Ukraine, and the amount of data accumulated was sufficient to accomplish unprecedented tasks.

Use the same set of standards to compare the real economic performance of different regions.

Slavajan Krasovsky compared the core indicators for the three pilot regions throughout 1985 with similar indicators for other regions in Ukraine.

Normally, a report should say "all targets assigned by superiors have been fully and exceeded." In any case, the language used by bureaucrats may vary, but it all boils down to one thing—deception.

Now, it's time to use information technology to break down this black box of power!

The comparison is astounding: the grain yield per unit area in the pilot states is 27% higher than that in non-pilot states!

This figure shocked everyone, because when Slava came to Ukraine, Shcherbitsky, in an effort to suppress him, forced him to allow pilot programs in regions with poor land conditions. However, Shcherbitsky had no idea of ​​the potential of information technology.

Efficient allocation greatly reduced transportation and storage losses, and optimized the harvesting rhythm. Most of the grain losses that would have occurred due to inefficient planning—some rotting in the fields, some becoming moldy and sprouting before reaching storage, some being "burnt" and flowing into the black market, and some being reduced in yield due to lack of care—were recovered.

To ensure the accuracy of the data, Slava and his confidants visited every warehousing system in the pilot states and interviewed agricultural workers within the consortium, just to make sure no one was deceiving him.

What reassured him was that deception did exist; some self-righteous officials, in order to curry favor with their superiors, asked data entry clerks and information center operators to falsify data. The inertia of this country's decades-old rigid bureaucratic command economy could not be completely resolved by a little over a year of reform.

Ultimately, the corrected grain yield per unit area fell back to 21%.

Other achievements of informatization are also very encouraging. The efficiency of material allocation in the pilot prefectures has been greatly improved, and the time for materials allocated from the central government to reach the grassroots level has been shortened by an average of six days.

Under normal circumstances, the amount of supplies decreases with each bureaucrat they pass through. This has been their power for decades. These supplies are either sold at high prices on the black market or become rewards given by bureaucrats to their "own people".

According to Slava's vision, as long as the production chain is transparent from top to bottom, and whistleblowing is encouraged based on the idea that "human nature is self-interested," then the problem of reselling can be solved.

However, the resistance came from the central government. In the Soviet Union, material allocation data was not ordinary administrative information, but a state secret. The reason why various allocation tables and material balance sheets from various ministries could not be made transparent was that material allocation reflected the true industrial capacity and military-industrial ratio; making it public would be tantamount to leaking secrets to NATO!

Moreover, the allocation ratios between departments reflect the strength of political factions, and making them public would expose factional struggles. Publicly disclosing the difference between the allocated and actual amounts is tantamount to publicly admitting the plan's failure...

Moreover, it is now the 80s, and corruption is now a form of vertical collusion rather than "exploitation of subordinates by superiors." Subordinates bribe their superiors to obtain excess allocations, rather than superiors deliberately withholding funds for personal gain. Many factory directors bribed their way to obtain more materials than planned to meet their targets, and transparency has actually prevented them from taking more.

Each major factory also had dedicated "procurement facilitators" whose job was to exchange relationships, gifts, and reciprocity for supplies. This gray system served as a lubricant for the rigid allocation of resources under the planned economy, and as early as 1957, scholars pointed out:

If the rules are strictly enforced, the factory simply won't be able to complete its plans!

Moreover, the whistleblowing channels themselves are controlled by corrupt networks—the People's Oversight Committees, the Party's Supervisory Committees, and the Procuratorates at the local level are often connected to the local Party committees. During Andropov's era, the KGB bypassed these channels to combat corruption, but the KGB itself was not neutral!

Therefore, Slava had no choice but to make concessions. Instead of disclosing the central government's allocation data to frontline workers to avoid political risks, the data was instead disclosed to the People's Oversight Committee, the Party's Supervisory Committee, and the Procuratorate through cross-disclosure, creating horizontal oversight.

Slava also changed the incentives for subordinates—for example, subordinates who truthfully reported the withheld supplies could benefit when quotas were recalculated. His KGB background also led him to promote the whistleblower system, encouraging reporting as much as possible.

This is the limit of what he can do at the local level; now he must return to the central government.

Even so, the people in these pilot states are very satisfied with Slava. They don't care about the plans or the allocation of supplies; they are happy as long as they have beef stew with potatoes in their pots.

Children, Khrushchev was right.

In the light industry sector, labor productivity has greatly improved. The three core initiatives of workers' committees, data transparency, and the principle of "more work, more sales, more pay" have led to a sharp drop in the proportion of workers skipping work, improved product quality pass rates, reduced scrap rates, and increased average worker income by nearly one-third.

The public response to the influx of more, newer, and better light industrial products into the market has been very positive. Some residents from neighboring states even took the train to the pilot state specifically to buy these products, which at one point caused a panic buying.

Since most of the goods purchased in the pilot states are meat products, the trains are always filled with a rich aroma of meat, which is why the locals call them "Sausage Express."

What about those who "use their brains" to buy large quantities of goods and then resell them in their hometowns, and are thus labeled as speculators by the local state committee?

Anyway, the plan proposed by Slava was to limit the number of purchases per person, but to his surprise, this purchase limit plan actually stimulated the public's desire to buy.

The variety of goods has increased and production has improved, but the number of people queuing has increased. Why is that?

In the non-pilot regions, which are strictly controlled by Sherbitsky, such as Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk, these indicators have basically remained stagnant.

After all, if they overproduce, the Central Planning Commission's target for the following year will increase, and then wouldn't it be like the Uzbek cotton case?

Cotton isn't for eating. If Ukraine dares to overstate its grain production like it overstates its cotton production, the people will go hungry and revolt!

Slava's subordinates had also brought up the issue of improving the performance indicators, but Slava assured them that:

"That's why you can't be a leader; we need to consider the bigger picture."

The current political landscape is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. We are currently implementing reforms at the local level; soon it will be the central government's turn.

After completing this report, which satisfied both the Party and the people, Slava immediately sent it to the preparatory materials package for the 27th Congress of the CPSU through Ryzhkov's channels.

It will be placed in each delegate's file bag as an appendix to Ryzhkov's economic report.

I imagine there'll be plenty to talk about at the 27th National Congress.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

On February 25, 1986, the 2th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was grandly opened in Moscow.

The conference was chaired by Second Secretary Ligachev, who delivered a report on cadre work on the second day:

The core theme of the report is to make cadres younger, more professional, and more knowledgeable, which aligns with the direction repeatedly emphasized by the General Secretary.

In the third part of the report, Ligachev suddenly named several comrades:

"In some republics and regions, the aging of the cadre team and insufficient cooperation with reforms have become prominent problems restricting the overall progress of economic modernization!"

We must face this reality—under the new circumstances where the Party demands accelerated development, any adherence to old ways and localism are unacceptable.

He didn't name anyone, but everyone knew who "individual constituent republics" referred to—because at least two-thirds of the more than three hundred delegates present had already flipped through the data comparison appendix in the file bag.

In his economic report, Ryzhkov was even more direct. He cited specific figures from the information technology pilot projects to demonstrate the strategic value of the national economic information technology project. Then, he changed the subject and mentioned that "the cooperation of some regions in information technology construction needs to be improved, which has affected the overall progress of the project."

Why don't you just name Sherbitsky directly?

That's probably what all the committee members present were thinking.

Shcherbitsky remained as composed as ever during the congress. He was level-headed and composed, sitting upright on the side of the podium with no intention of resigning.

The congress concluded on March 6, with the new Five-Year Plan outline and the new party platform being adopted, and on the surface everything seemed normal.

...

The repercussions of the conference quickly spread in March.

First, the issue of trade with China was brought to the forefront. In mid-March, China formally raised its concerns about the quality of grain produced in Ukraine through foreign trade channels.

"If the quality issues persist, China will consider adjusting its procurement quota for the next year and shifting it to other production areas."

This means that hundreds of millions of dollars in export orders could be lost from Ukraine, and in the context of collapsing oil prices, every penny of hard currency income is a lifeline.

The data provided by the Chinese side shows that the quality of grain produced in Ukraine cannot be guaranteed. In non-pilot areas, about 15 percent of the grain was returned, while in the pilot areas, the figure was only 2 percent.

PS: Even in 2010, Lao Zhong's food self-sufficiency rate was still less than 90%, and he still needed to import food every year.

If China were to withdraw its support while the league is facing financial difficulties, it wouldn't be a good thing. Now, the issue of Sherbitsky will have to come to the table!

Ryzhkov reported at the Council of Ministers: "If the quality of Ukraine's grain exports continues to decline, we will face the risk of failing to fulfill our trade contracts with China."

The disparity in quality compliance rates between areas with and without information technology coverage indicates that the problem lies not in agriculture itself, but in the management system!

Then there's the Chernobyl rectification. The control rod modification of Unit 4 was successfully completed during the annual maintenance in March, but a large number of additional problems were discovered during the modification process, mostly caused by rushing to meet the deadline.

These problems are not technically serious, but politically they further confirm the systemic lapses in the security management of centrally administered facilities in Ukraine under Sherbitsky's rule.

Gorbachev made the decision.

In early April, Gorbachev had a “frank exchange of views” with Politburo member Sherbitsky in private, and the General Secretary “sincerely suggested” that Sherbitsky, if his health and age allowed, “carefully consider making way for the younger generation of cadres.”

This was actually an ultimatum to him.

Shcherbitsky remained silent for a whole day afterward. That night, the 67-year-old veteran pondered for a long time:

Can he still resist? Who in the Politburo will speak up for him? Tikhonov has retired, Kunayev has been marginalized, Romanov is gone...

The Dnieper gang's network has been severed, leaving him as the only remaining member.

In late April, Shcherbitsky submitted his retirement application to the Central Committee. The reason given was health reasons—a respectable excuse used countless times in Soviet politics, one that everyone knew wasn't the real reason but everyone pretended to believe.

Gorbachev “regretfully accepted” the application at the Politburo meeting, thanking Sherbitsky for his outstanding contributions to Ukraine and the Union over the past fourteen years, and preserving his pension and all his honorary titles.

Without stigmatization or public retribution, he retired with dignity.

A man who had ruled a republic of fifty million people for fourteen years quietly stepped down from the stage of power.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

The story of the General Secretary of Ukraine has come to an end, but the story of the Ukrainian people is far from over.

The first question after Shcherbitsky's passing was: who would inherit his legacy?

If the new First Secretary of Ukraine is one of Gorbachev's close associates, then everything Naslava has built in Ukraine could be overthrown by the newcomer; if he is a moderate reformer, then policy continuity can be maintained.

Ultimately, the Politburo selected a compromise figure acceptable to both sides. Regarding the question of whether to expand informatization, a committee was formed to discuss it in detail—by the time the discussion was completed, the Soviet Union would likely have collapsed, and the few pilot regions remaining in Slava would continue the informatization process.

Then there's Slava's own whereabouts.

In late April, Ryzhkov, in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, formally submitted a work request report to the Central Secretariat, stating that the advancement of the national economic informatization project required a specialist with practical experience to coordinate and oversee the project at the central level.

The report details the cross-departmental coordination challenges currently facing this project:

The Ministry of Electronics Industry, the Ministry of Communications, the State Planning Commission, and other industrial ministries had inconsistent technical standards, disputes over resource allocation, and lacked an authoritative coordinating body to break down barriers.

The report recommends the establishment of a "National Economic and Information Technology Commission" as an inter-departmental coordinating body under the Ministerial Conference, with a member having practical experience in information technology development serving as its director.

You might as well just fill in Slava's name.

Gorbachev hesitated on the report, knowing full well what recalling Slava to Moscow meant: the "Andropov Orphans Union," which troubled him, would be reunited in the same city from its scattered state.

But he had no reason to refuse. He had approved the information technology project himself, he had proposed the accelerated development himself, and if he rejected the personnel recommendations made by Ryzhkov as prime minister within his administrative authority, it would be tantamount to openly turning against his own prime minister!

Moreover, during the same period, the leader also submitted a report to Gorbachev on "An Assessment of the Impact of the International Information Technology Revolution on the Economic Competitiveness of the Soviet Union," which concluded that:

"If the Soviet Union cannot establish a nationwide economic information infrastructure within the next five years, the technological gap between us and Western countries will change from being catch-up to being irreversible."

Gorbachev could not tell the world that the Soviet Union was embracing the technological revolution while refusing to appoint someone to handle information technology.

In May, the Central Secretariat approved Ryzhkov's recommendation.

Slava was officially appointed as the head of the State Economic Information Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

This was a newly created position, equivalent to a minister in administrative rank, and his role as secretary of agriculture was officially handed over to his previous acting secretary.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Slava left Ukraine on a morning in mid-May.

He took one last look at the view outside the window from his office: early summer in Ukraine, sunflower fields just sprouting, the black earth glistening with a damp sheen in the morning light, and a tractor slowly moving across the field in the distance, leaving a light brown furrow.

Krasovsky stood at the door, waiting to make the final handover with him.

While organizing the documents, Slava gave him instructions regarding his final affairs.

"clear."

This young man, who was just a deputy secretary of a district committee in Vinnytsia a year ago, has grown from a novice into a pragmatic cadre capable of independently managing information technology nodes in several states in the past twelve months.

The most important thing he learned from Slava can be summed up in four words—