Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

Moscow is colder than usual this year, with temperatures remaining below minus 20 degrees Celsius for two consecutive weeks. Every morning when Slava enters the office, he warms his hands on the radiator for a while before holding a pen.

I miss the Far East. The heating system in Blagoveshchensk was built to military standards, while the one in the Kremlin...

These pipes, which are said to have been aging since the Khrushchev era, sometimes make one wonder if they, like their owners, are waiting to be replaced.

Chernenko has completely disappeared from public view this month.

In mid-January, the summit of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, originally scheduled to be held in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, was announced to be cancelled. TASS reported that it was postponed to a later date after consultation among all parties.

Of course, diplomatic jargon needs to be encoded:

When the Soviets said "postponement," it should be interpreted as "cancellation." When they said "a consensus was reached by all parties," it should be interpreted as "the General Secretary is too sick to get out of bed."

At this time, the Soviet official media was still trying to maintain an illusion. On January 191, recorded by cameras, party officials formally nominated Chernenko as a candidate for deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in his absence; the footage was shown on television for about fifteen seconds.

On the table in front of an empty chair sits a nameplate for the General Secretary. A middle-aged cadre is reading the nomination resolution, with a voice-over saying, "Comrade Chernenko, due to his busy schedule, has entrusted..."

Moscow residents who see this will probably switch their TVs to the ice hockey channel.

The British newspaper *Sunday Times* bluntly reported on January 27 that Chernenko would "retire soon due to illness and be succeeded by Gorbachev," while a memo submitted by the U.S. State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research to Schultz stated:

"...The CIA report shows that the Politburo had actually decided that Gorbachev would succeed Chernenko before his death."

Everyone is waiting for an inevitable ending, but no one is idle in the process of waiting.

...

Slava and Gorbachev maintained a delicate, superficial peace after their quarrel on December 24.

The two continued to cooperate closely in their daily work within the Secretariat of the Central Committee: agricultural reports were signed off as scheduled, joint pilot projects were promoted as planned, and progress reports on the withdrawal working group from Afghanistan were provided as usual...

No outsider unaware of the inside story could see the rift between the two.

But those in the know can sense the change in the air from certain details:

The two no longer drink tea together after get off work to discuss the next day's work as they used to. Slava's agricultural reports are now delivered to Gorbachev through his secretary instead of being placed on his desk as in the past.

When referring to Slava, Gorbachev began to use "Comrade Ivanov" instead of the previously used "Velikoslav Ivanovich".

But neither of them was stupid. They both knew that with Chernenko still alive and the conservatives and Romanov still watching them closely, an open split would be tantamount to suicide. Therefore, a facade of unity had to be maintained, while the real struggle would take place beneath the surface.

Slava's biggest problem is that his foundation is too shallow.

Member of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat for Agriculture—these titles sound impressive, but on the power chessboard of the Politburo, he was merely a pawn who had just crossed the river.

His influence was limited to the agricultural sector and a few related industrial coordination agencies, plus the connections he had established within the Ministry of Defense through Ogarkov, and the informal networks he maintained through the KGB system...

These combined allow him to voice his opinions on certain specific issues, but are far from enough to rival Gorbachev on an overall level.

Gorbachev has ten times the resources of him!

He was the de facto Second Secretary, presiding over the day-to-day work of the Central Secretariat and the Politburo, and controlling the power to recommend personnel appointments and removals. His subordinate, Ligachev, was in charge of personnel organization, while Shevardnadze was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—yes, Gromyko transferred this Georgian to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Deputy Minister in early January, ostensibly to "strengthen the cadre ranks of the diplomatic system," but in reality, he was giving Gorbachev an informant and agent in the diplomatic sphere.

What's even more interesting is that Gromyko specifically instructed his secretary to inform Slava when making this arrangement.

Gromyko, that old fox, will never completely reassure either side, nor will he ever completely despair of either side; the very fact that everyone needs him is the value of his existence.

Edward Shevardnadze was the First Secretary of Georgia. In the original history, he was promoted to Foreign Minister by Gorbachev in 1985, making him one of the two political stars in the Soviet Union.

He conducted anti-corruption experiments in Georgia, was ideologically inclined towards reform, and, like the notorious traitor, liberal, and reactionary Alexander Yakovlev, was a member of Gorbachev's inner circle.

However, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev should not be considered the same group, because in 1985 Gorbachev was still putting on a good show, and the two had a lot in common.

In fact, after Gotukov's victory, which nearly cost him the title of champion, his core team at the time was a very broad alliance – which was precisely why he was able to take over.

It means different things to different people.

Gorbachev's inner circle was far from monolithic; his core team was a wide-spectrum alliance. For example, consider the figures in his inner circle in 1985:

Shevardnadze, the foreign minister, wanted to end the rigid diplomatic approach and could not accept that Gorbachev had parted ways with him in 88;

Yakovlev wanted profound ideological and political change, and later turned from a reformist to an anti-communist.

Ligachev wanted a cleaner and more efficient party. He and Ryzhkov were promoted by Andropov. He was the most conservative member and was in charge of organizational work and personnel.

He supported anti-corruption efforts, disciplinary reforms, and the rejuvenation of the cadre ranks, but his reform logic was Andropov-esque—to rectify order within the party framework, rather than to shake the system itself. By the end of 1987, his differences with Gorbachev had become public.

Ryzhkov wanted more rational economic management. He was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) in 1985. He came from the Ural heavy industry system and was a typical technocrat. He also supported economic reforms, but his idea was to improve the efficiency of the planned economy rather than introduce market mechanisms.

In 88, he was deeply dissatisfied with the chaos of Gorbachev's economic policies;

As for Gromyko, he wanted a young General Secretary whom he could influence. His nomination of Gorbachev as General Secretary at the pivotal Politburo meeting in March 1985 was a political deal—Gromyko received the honorary position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

As for the remaining large number of middle-level managers, they simply want to follow the right person.

Their consensus was limited to "the status quo is unsustainable and some kind of change is needed." As for the direction and depth of change, even Gorbachev himself probably didn't have a clear blueprint in 1985.

This alliance was destined to split as the reforms deepened—in fact, it had already broken apart in early 1988 before the reforms had even begun.

Did Gorbachev have any truly pro-Western, multi-party, privatization-oriented liberals around him at this time?

No! This concept itself was almost non-existent in the political discourse of the Soviet Communist Party at the time!

If we had to pinpoint a specific school of thought, there had been a trend toward market socialism in the economics field since the 1960s. By around 1985, these market proponents were mostly concentrated in a few academic institutions, particularly the Central Institute of Economic Mathematics, the Institute of Economics and Industrial Organization in Novosibirsk, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

These scholars were later employed by Gorbachev, especially after his political alliances collapsed in 87.

Nikolai Petrakov – briefly served as Gorbachev's economic advisor and advocated for price liberalization;

Stanislav Shatalin – one of the main drafters of the later “500-Day Plan”;

Nikolai Shmelev – published a sensational article in Novosti in 1987 criticizing the planned economy;

Gavriel Popov – an economist who later became the mayor of Moscow.

But these people were academics in 1985, not political players. Their radical ideas were only written in internal reports and small-circle discussions, and had not yet entered the policy agenda.

Therefore, there are no extreme liberals in Gorbachev's circle now. The real liberals are all waiting in the Union's academic reserve pool for Gorbachev to draw cards from. These people will eventually enter the center of power.

So, are there any true "democratic socialists"?

If we don't follow Stalin's centralized power model or an authoritarian regime, but instead pursue genuine Soviet democracy as Lenin envisioned, where have these people gone?

Some were crushed by tanks in the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968, while others are mixed up with liberals—neither has had the chance to test their positions in realpolitik.

Many reformers considered themselves "true Leninists" or "democracyists" in 1985, but after being tested by reality, they found themselves in 1990 to have actually moved towards social democracy or even liberalism.

P.S.: Social democracy and democratic socialism are two different things.

Actually, I've been a social citizen for a long time.jpg

For example, Anatoly Sobchak was a law professor at Leningrad State University in 1985, a respectable scholar within the system. By 1989, he was one of the most vocal reform voices in the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, and later became the mayor of St. Petersburg and Putin's political mentor.

It only takes four years to go from a rule-of-law reformer within the system to a de facto Western-style liberal.

Later, these liberal intellectuals shunned Gotto and joined forces with Yeltsin, forming the "Intra-Party Democratic Program" in 1990, which advocated transforming the CPSU into a social democratic party under a parliamentary democracy.

Once the Soviet Union collapsed, they immediately stopped acting and started speeding towards liberalism.

We talked about intra-party democracy when the Party was still in charge, and we still talk about intra-party democracy now that the Party is no longer in charge. Then what was the point of the Soviet Union's collapse?

The liberals and compradors were prepared to become incredibly wealthy, but what would happen to the vast majority of Soviet people after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Only God knows.

Therefore, for any reformist's opinions, if he can maintain his position after being severely tested by reality, then he is truly impressive. If he immediately surrenders and becomes a liberal after being tested, then he has only revealed his true nature, and his previous reformist face was just a disguise in front of the establishment.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

At the same time, the drafting of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan has entered the substantive preparatory stage.

At this time of year, the budget war between the various ministries of the alliance officially begins.

Whether officials can monetize their power within this black box of a command economy depends on this one move; the formulation of each five-year plan is a massive negotiation of resource allocation.

How much does the Ministry of National Defense need? How much does heavy industry need? How much does light industry need? How much does agriculture need? How much does scientific research need? How much social welfare needs?...

Behind each number lies the power share of a ministry or interest group.

In a normal year, this negotiation would have been led by the General Secretary and the State Planning Commission, but with Chernenko bedridden, the initiative in the negotiation actually fell between Gorbachev and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Tikhonov—the former representing the reformist direction, and the latter representing the Dnieper faction and the conservatives.

Ryzhkov was assigned to lead a crucial preparatory task—the Special Working Group on Scientific and Technological Advancement.

This working group began operating in November 1984, with the goal of providing an economic reform plan for the Central Committee plenary session scheduled for April 1985. This arrangement made Ryzhkov an indispensable figure in the formulation of the Five-Year Plan. Although he was not a decision-maker, he controlled the data and the output of the plan, and everyone who wanted to influence the direction of the Five-Year Plan had to deal with him.

So Slava began frequent contact with Ryzhkov in the second week of January.

The two men’s first formal working meeting took place in a conference room in the State Planning Commission building.

Ryzhkov, 55, came from the Ural heavy industry system. Before becoming a member of the Central Committee, he was the director of the Ural Heavy Machinery Plant. The pragmatic temperament characteristic of managers of large state-owned enterprises was very evident in him.

“Comrade Ivanov, I have studied your agricultural cooperative,” Ryzhkov said bluntly, with a Slava cooperative operation report and several charts covered with dense numbers spread out in front of him.

“I think your approach to integrating production and research is sound, and the direction of information data collection is also correct, but the scale is too small—a few pilot states and 173 production and research consortia. This scale of experimentation cannot prove anything statistically.”

“I know, but the equipment and communications infrastructure needed to expand from a few border states to the entire alliance is an order of magnitude investment that the current budget simply cannot cover.”

"So you came to me wanting to secure a budget for agricultural informatization in the five-year plan?"

“No, not just agriculture,” Slava pushed a report he had spent two weeks preparing in front of Ryzhkov.

"My idea is to extend the framework of agricultural informatization to the industrial sector—to establish a cross-departmental economic informatization project in the five-year plan, to unify the planning of data network construction from agriculture to industry, and to unify technical standards and equipment procurement."

This is much more efficient and cheaper than each ministry doing its own thing.

Ryzhkov flipped through the report, his gaze lingering noticeably longer on the budget than elsewhere: if each ministry were to build its own information system, under the current ACY model, the annual waste would be estimated at between 3 and 5 billion rubles, while unified planning could save at least 40 percent of the investment.

This year, the alliance's economy is not doing well. Oil prices are continuing to decline, and the amount of foreign exchange earned is not enough to fill the gaps in various domestic sectors that are desperately in need of funding.

“Where did you get these numbers?” Ryzhkov asked.

"This was obtained by cross-referencing internal reports from the Ministry of Electronics Industry and the Ministry of Instrument Manufacturing, along with actual cost data from the information technology construction of our various industry-research consortia."

Indeed, information technology and automation have greatly improved efficiency and accuracy. I strongly recommend that we also implement information technology and automation in industry.

Comrade Ryzhkov, OGAS is not a distant dream.

Slava, having put his ideas into practice, is more convincing than the Slava who only talked the talk two years ago.

Ryzhkov closed the report and placed it on the table, tapping the cover twice with his fingers.

That action made Slava realize that high-ranking Soviet officials might actually have a traditional gene for using tapping to aid their thinking.

"Let's put OGAS aside for now. I don't have the authority to deal with those old bureaucrats. I agree with your approach," he said.

"But there is a question, Comrade Ivanov—what is the relationship between your plan and the economic reform direction led by Comrade Gorbachev? He advocates expanding enterprise autonomy, introducing market pricing, and accelerating ownership reform, while you advocate informatization and the integration of production and research. How will these two approaches be coordinated in the Five-Year Plan?"

This is a big problem, because he still doesn't know whether Ryzhkov is on his side or on Gotu.

If Slava's answer sounds like he's openly contradicting Gorbachev, Ryzhkov might back down for not wanting to offend the Second Secretary, which wouldn't do!

“Comrade Ryzhkov, I don’t think the two lines are contradictory,” Slava replied tactfully.

"Comrade Gorbachev was concerned with the direction of institutional reform—enterprise autonomy, price mechanisms... these are macro-level institutional changes. I am concerned with the micro-level technological infrastructure construction, information networks, data standards, and the modernization of production management."

Reforms in direction and technological infrastructure should be promoted in tandem, rather than replacing each other.

You can't conduct market pricing in an environment where information is opaque and data is unreliable. The market is never omnipotent; that's like shooting arrows in a dark room! How can you aim if you can't even see where the target is?

Ryzhkov smiled; as someone who came from a factory background, he had a natural affinity for this kind of concrete expression.

The two spent the next hour discussing the specific framework of the information technology special project in the five-year plan.

Ryzhkov asked about every single detail, from budget size and equipment sourcing to technical standards and organizational structure. Slava liked this kind of technocrat, especially one who liked to get things done.

What these pragmatists have in common is that they are more concerned with how to do it than with why they do it; the latter is a politician's business, and the former is an engineer's business.

The league desperately needs this kind of talent!

After the meeting, Ryzhkov shook hands with Slava at the door to say goodbye, saying:

"Bring your information technology pilot data next time, and I'll have the working group see if it can be included in the reform plan discussion at the April plenary session."

When Slava walked out of the State Planning Commission building, it was snowing in Moscow. The fine snowflakes swirled in the halo of the streetlights, like countless tiny dancers completing their own choreography.

He stood on the steps watching the snow for a while, then wrote in his notebook:

“Ryzhkov comes from an industrial background, values ​​technology over ideology, is not enthusiastic about marketization, but is interested in improving efficiency. We can cooperate.”

...

But the approach of another person surprised Slava.

Gorbachev's formidable rival, Romanov, came to find him.

In mid-January, Romanov conveyed an informal invitation to Slava through an intermediary, asking him to visit Leningrad to learn about its experience in industrial informatization.

He did not extend a formal invitation to the secretaries of the Central Secretariat in his capacity as a member of the Politburo, but rather did so in a very tactful manner: