Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

"Comrades, the military drain in Afghanistan is severely undermining our combat readiness in other areas."

He opened a document in front of him and read out a few numbers:

Afghanistan consumes an equivalent of one-third of the Far East Military District’s annual ammunition and fuel reserves. If the 100,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan were recalled to China, they could form three to four fully-staffed motorized infantry divisions for use in Central Europe. The logistical transport capacity supporting Afghanistan accounts for more than 40% of the Central Asia Military District’s railway transport capacity!

“This year’s NATO’s Elite Shooter 83 exercise has proven one thing,” Ogarkov tapped the table, “our conventional force deployment in Central Europe is no longer sufficient to deal with a possible sudden attack by NATO!”

One of the reasons is that a large amount of resources are locked up in Afghanistan.

If we are to seriously advance the modernization and informatization reform of the military—a point clearly indicated by the General Secretary at the June plenary session—then we must release the resources currently being occupied by Afghanistan!

Okay, the military reformists want to end it quickly, while the establishment wants a slow, gradual, planned, and rhythmic withdrawal.

Then came Gromyko, whose statement represented the position of the Union diplomatic system.

After all, he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for thirty years.

He mentioned the possibility of seeking a political solution through the UN framework, indirect engagement with Pakistan and Iran to build confidence, and the feasibility of exploring a ceasefire arrangement without compromising Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This cunning foreign minister's every word can be interpreted as either supporting negotiations or opposing concessions; that's Gromyko's skill.

Then there's Chernenko.

The representative of the conservatives cleared his throat and slowly uttered what all those present who opposed the withdrawal wanted to say but dared not:

"Comrades, we must consider one issue—"

What would it mean for our allies around the world if we withdrew from Afghanistan or reduced our military presence?

Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Yemen... these countries are all watching us!

If the alliance chooses to back down when facing US-backed insurgents, then every Third World ally dependent on Soviet security guarantees will begin to question: Will Moscow still be on our side next time it's our turn?

He paused for a moment and looked around the room.

"We are not just paying the price of a local war in Afghanistan; we are sacrificing the credibility of the alliance as the leader of the socialist camp!"

Losing this credibility means losing more than just Afghanistan! It means losing a network of allies across half the globe!

It's okay. Actually, the Americans did it too. We didn't see the Americans do anything when Thatcher made a fool of herself in the Falklands War.

Slava thought this way, but he dared not say that many reformers shared his opinion.

He looked around carefully, observing the expressions of each committee member.

Not everyone agrees with Chernenko, but many people admit to themselves that there is some truth to what he said.

The alliance's global influence is largely based on its commitment to protect its allies, and if that commitment is compromised in Afghanistan, the ripple effects could extend far beyond Central Asia.

But if the alliance goes to protect other allies, then who will save the alliance?

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Andropov spoke only after everyone else had finished.

"I have heard all the opinions of my comrades. It is normal and healthy to have differences. Let me say a few words."

He picked up his enamel mug and took a sip of tea.

"First, in my view, the Afghan issue is a matter of strategic resource allocation."

The data from Comrades Ustinov and Ogarkov illustrate one thing—the resources we have invested in Afghanistan are seriously disproportionate to the strategic returns we have received from Afghanistan.

This disproportion might have been acceptable in 1979, but by 1983, with the need to simultaneously contend with NATO military pressure, advance domestic economic reforms, and maintain a global network of allies, it had become an unbearable burden!

"Second, Comrade Chernenko raised the issue of credibility."

Well said, I completely agree!

We cannot let our allies feel that the alliance is backing down, but credibility does not equate to unlimited investment. A great power that has exhausted its own strength through overexpansion will actually have a reduced ability to protect its allies.

The Americans made this mistake in Vietnam, and we must not repeat it.

He glanced up at Chernenko, saving his face, and then continued.

"Third, I do not intend to make a decision on troop withdrawal today—this issue is too big and too complicated to be resolved in one meeting."

However, I propose the establishment of a dedicated working group to study a comprehensive plan aimed at gradually reducing direct Soviet military intervention while ensuring the survival of the Afghan government and the security of the Soviet Union's southern flank.

The working group, jointly composed of personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff, and the KGB, reported directly to me.

After he finished speaking, the atmosphere in the hall relaxed a bit.

The classic compromise is to find a middle ground between the two factions. In a political bureau where neither the reformists nor the conservatives can gain an overwhelming advantage, it is normal for both sides to compromise.

But what Andropov said next was what really made the few people in the know in the room prick up their ears.

“However, I have some specific ideas for the working group to consider,” he said, slowing his pace. “Regarding how to maintain influence over the situation in Afghanistan while reducing the involvement of Soviet regular troops—we can consider some unconventional methods.”

"Unconventional methods?"

The phrase elicited several subtle exchanges of glances in the hall. Ustinov glanced at Ogarkov, who didn't look back, but quickly scribbled a few words in his notebook.

Everyone present knew that Andropov had a penchant for using unofficial personnel to do important things during his KGB days, and this wasn't just about appointing Slava and Nyan as "special advisors."

A few minutes later, they moved on to the next topic, and Andropov did not elaborate on the previous discussion until the end of the meeting.

Clearly, the specific meaning of unconventional methods will be discussed in a smaller, unrecorded meeting.

Big things are discussed in small meetings, and small things are discussed in large meetings; you'll get used to it.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

The meeting ended at around 4:30 p.m.

When Slava came out of the hall, he met Gorbachev in the corridor.

Gorbachev must have been waiting there on purpose; his posture of leaning against the window in the corridor looking at the scenery was so casual that it seemed deliberate.

“Comrade Velikoslav Ivanovich,” Gorbachev used his full name and patronym, indicating this was a formal rather than private conversation, “how did you find today’s meeting?”

“I think setting up a working group is the right first step, Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich,” Slava gave a safe answer.

“Hmm,” Gorbachev nodded, but his expression showed that this was not what he wanted to hear.

"Regarding the 'unconventional methods' Yuri mentioned at the previous meeting—do you know what he meant?"

This question instantly alerted Slava: Did Gorbachev genuinely not know, or was he testing how much he knew?

Given Gorbachev's position within Andropov's inner circle, it's impossible he was completely unaware, but he might have wanted to confirm whether Slava was also in that circle.

“I have some ideas,” Slava said, offering an excuse, “but they need more detailed discussion to take shape. Perhaps we can talk to the General Secretary about them.”

“Then let’s find a time to talk,” Gorbachev patted him on the shoulder.

“You’re in my department now, and the agricultural reform needs to continue. I’ve read your report on the consortium in Amur. The idea is good, and I think it’s highly feasible, but it’s encountered a lot of obstacles in implementation—bring me a summary and your next steps later.”

Slava is now the deputy director of the agricultural department of the Central Secretariat, and can also be referred to as Director Slava.

“Yes, Mikhail Sergeyevich.”

Gorbachev smiled and walked away. As he reached the corner of the corridor, he turned back and said:

"By the way, what was the name of that hoodlum you ran into in Leningrad—what was his name again?"

It took Slava a few seconds to realize who he was talking about. It was the young man who had been nearly robbed two years ago in Leningrad, the one who was eventually taken away by the KGB.

"Ah, yes, I remember now, his name is Prigozin—Yevgeny Prigozin."

"Yes, remember this name." Gorbachev said, then turned the corner and disappeared at the end of the corridor, leaving Slava standing there alone.

No, how would Gorbachev know about Prigozin?

Before Slava could figure out the problem, Director Nian walked over from another direction, holding a cup of coffee he didn't know where he got it from—the Kremlin canteen does serve coffee, although the quality can't compare to that in Geneva.

"What's wrong? Why are you standing here in a daze?"

“Godzilla just mentioned Prigozin to me.”

Director Nian's eyebrows twitched slightly.

“Wow, interesting,” she said, taking a sip of her coffee and wrinkling her nose.

"It seems that President An has already been speaking to his young men."

"Unconventional methods, you know, someone always has to do the dirty work."

"How do you think Gorbachev intends to use him?"

"Taking a young man with street survival skills, strong organizational abilities, and no moral bottom line out of prison and giving him a chance to redeem himself—by sending him to a distant place to recruit people for dirty work—who does this description resemble?"

Slava looked at her without saying anything.

“Just like when you were released from the Lubyanka interrogation room two years ago,” Director Nian placed his coffee cup on the windowsill, “except you were doing mental work while he was doing physical work, but the essence is the same—”

Andropov, even during his KGB days, preferred to use people outside the system to do things that those within the system couldn't or wouldn't do.

Director Nian pulled down his sunglasses, his rose-red eyes fixed on Slava.

"This trick often works wonders, aren't we the perfect example?"

...

That night, Slava returned to her apartment.

The place he and Director Nian stayed in in Moscow is still there. It's been uninhabited for nine months and is covered in a layer of dust, but the heating is still on.

Sitting at the table, he began to organize his complete ideas on the Afghan issue.

He had already mentally rehearsed this idea many times during those sleepless nights in the Amur region, and now he needed to transfer it from his mind to paper.

The first priority is to achieve a phased withdrawal of regular Soviet troops while ensuring the survival of the Kabul regime and the security of the southern flank of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet forces were instructed to cease their offensive operations and shift their focus to defense and training of the Afghan government forces. Frontline combat duties were gradually transferred to the government forces.

At the same time, they began to engage with all parties through UN channels to explore the possibility of establishing a ceasefire mechanism.

It would be great if an international ceasefire line could be successfully established like in Kashmir, but the jihadists are not a monolithic group. The financial backers who support them all have their own agendas. If the United Nations wants to hold ceasefire negotiations, the jihadists themselves probably won't be able to find an opinion leader until 1988!

We cannot rely entirely on the United Nations.

What will happen to Afghanistan after the main Soviet forces withdraw in batches?

It can't be that only God knows.

At least a military advisory group and logistical support troops should be maintained. The security vacuum on the front lines should be filled by two forces—the Afghan government forces trained and equipped by the Soviet army, and an "international volunteer assistance force."

He wrote an entire page about international volunteer aid efforts—the boldest and most controversial part of his concept.

This force is organized differently from the regular Soviet army; it will operate as a special project of the KGB or the General Staff Intelligence Directorate.

Volunteers with military experience were recruited from countries such as Cuba, Angola, and Yemen. After completing training at training bases within the Soviet Union, they were deployed to Afghanistan under the guise of "internationalist assistance at the request of the Afghan government."

This force's command chain did not go through the Ministry of Defense's formal system, but reported directly to the Kremlin. Its personnel were not included in the Soviet Army's organizational structure or casualty statistics, and its equipment and funding were drawn from the KGB's special budget.

Simply put, it was a Soviet proxy force that didn't wear Soviet military uniforms—the Soviet version of the Wagnerian mercenary group.

Once the front lines are relatively stable, the UN-led Afghan peace process can be initiated, with the Kabul government controlling the main cities and northwestern regions, and the jihadist militants controlling the southeastern mountains—separated by an internationally monitored ceasefire line.

Under Slava's arrangement, the area controlled by the jihadists will border Old Zhong, and the increasingly powerful Wahhabist extremist forces among the jihadists will inevitably infiltrate northward, posing a direct threat to the Muslim community in western Old Zhong.

This will force Zhong to reassess his policy of supporting jihadists—you can't provide weapons and funding to a bunch of religious extremists and expect them not to export extremism to your own backyard, can you?

This is also supported by history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have indeed posed a threat to the stability of western Afghanistan. This is why after 00, China stopped supporting Afghan jihadists and instead cooperated with the United States in the fight against terrorism.

Focusing on the main contradiction, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, we opposed the Soviet Union's control of Afghanistan and its attempt to encircle it from three sides. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we reconsidered the threat posed by the jihadists themselves.

Slava also added content on military reforms at the end of the outline:

Afghanistan could serve as a testing ground for the Soviet army's new equipment and tactics.

The achievements of Ogarkov's information technology reforms, the decentralized command concept validated by the Blue Force battalion in Exercise 81, and the new unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and electronic warfare equipment currently under development...

These things all need to be tested and improved in the actual combat environment. Although the mountain counter-guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan is completely different from the large-scale mobile warfare in Central Europe, it can at least provide valuable experimental data in basic aspects such as communication, reconnaissance and command coordination.

He wrote until 2 a.m. before stopping, and Director Nian stayed with him while he wrote until she passed out on the sofa.

Slava carried the young director to the bed, then sealed the outline and put it in his briefcase. Tomorrow he would present it to Andropov—through Gorbachev's channels, since he was now Gorbachev's man, at least in the administrative hierarchy.

Outside the window, the Moscow night was bone-chillingly cold. The orange glow of the streetlights cast warm spots on the snow, and in the distance, the red star atop the Kremlin tower shone a dark red in the night sky, like a charcoal ember about to burn out.

There were only two weeks left in 1983.

In this year, humanity pulled back from the brink of nuclear annihilation, two superpowers signed an agreement in Geneva that brought relief to the world, and an aging empire took its first step toward change.

Andropov's time was running out in his office in the Kremlin.

He passed away in February 1984, and in this world, history is being written by a new generation.