Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

“This is such a waste,” Ogarkov said. “A country developing several main battle tank technologies at the same time is something the Americans do. The Americans only have one M1, the British only have one Challenger, and the French only have one Leclerc. Only we are now maintaining two systems at the same time, causing the three design bureaus to undermine each other.”

The second factor is nepotism. Every design bureau has a political backer—Kharkov is in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian republic's leadership speaks on its behalf, because securing projects for the Kharkiv design bureau can boost Ukraine's economic development.

Nizhny Tagil is located in Sverdlovsk, where the local Party committee supports it. Project allocation often isn't based on technical specifications, but rather on who has the strongest connections.

During the Brezhnev era, military tenders directly involved factors such as who Defense Minister Ustinov had a good relationship with, which military district commander supported which plan, and which design bureau's chief designer had connections in the Central Committee.

Thirdly, there was a waste of resources due to duplication. The three design bureaus each did their own thing—each developed its own fire control system, and each conducted materials research. The same basic research was repeated, and in the end, only one company's solution was chosen, while the investments of the other two were completely wasted.

Fourthly, there is the information barrier. The secrecy between design bureaus extends beyond external communication to include mutual confidentiality. Kharkov's aluminum alloy engine technology and composite armor design for the T-64 were unavailable to Tagil, and vice versa.

“Comrade General Secretary,” Ogarkov said, “if we want to develop the next generation of new equipment, my suggestion is to first solve these systemic problems. Otherwise, no matter how much money we invest, the final result will still be several design bureaus each developing their own, resulting in duplication and waste in producing three prototypes. Then, the design bureaus will find connections and backers in the Politburo, and finally decide which one to choose through power transactions.”

Slava was aware of the problems Ogarkov mentioned. He had initiated the reorganization of the nine ministries of the military industry in 1987—but integration at the design bureau level was more difficult than at the ministry level.

Because behind the design bureau lies not only an administrative system, but also decades of accumulated technical expertise, a skilled workforce, and local interests. It cannot be simply dismantled like a ministry; the local interests involved are too numerous, and sometimes a single design bureau directly supports an entire city.

“What do you think about eliminating competition and having everyone work together to create something—assuming no resistance to reform?” Slava asked.

Ogarkov shook his head: "Completely eliminating competition is not a good option either."

The US approach is to engage in fierce competition during the bidding phase, and then concentrate resources on the winner once a selection is made. For example, Chrysler defeated General Motors in the M1 tank bidding, resulting in only one production line. Similarly, Lockheed defeated Boeing in the F-22 bidding at the end of last year.

This model is highly efficient, but the cost is that a winner-takes-all outcome can easily lead to a monopoly, and the design capabilities of the losing party gradually diminish.

The United States is now facing the predicament of having only one supplier in some military-industrial sectors, which means the country is at risk of suppliers arbitrarily demanding prices.

"In Western Europe, they followed a multinational joint research and development route. The Leopard 2 was basically developed by West Germany alone. However, the tank jointly developed by France and Germany is still in production difficulties because the transaction costs of multinational coordination are extremely high. The struggle for technological dominance is even more difficult to reconcile than the competition between our design bureaus."

Israel's model is more extreme: a small country, a single design center, and a single Merkava tank production line—highly centralized and rapidly iterating. However, this is only feasible in a small country with clearly defined needs and intensive combat feedback. The size and diverse needs of the Soviet Union made it impossible for it to adopt the Israeli model.

Israel's intensive feedback from actual combat suggests it needs to examine its own problems; the Soviet Union's situation was different.

Ultimately, Ogarkov presented his solution:

The retention of competitive preliminary research and bidding phases was the truly valuable part of the Soviet system—allowing different design bureaus to showcase their strengths in the concept and prototype stages, and this intellectual competition genuinely stimulated innovation. However, after the bidding process, the design teams of the losing proposals didn't simply retreat into isolation to wait for the next round; instead, they were integrated into the engineering teams of the winning proposals. Technical personnel moved freely, and knowledge was no longer confined within institutional walls.

At the same time, a cross-design bureau technology-sharing platform should be established within the military's existing information network. There is no reason to duplicate investments in areas such as armor material research, fire control electronic components, and basic engine technologies. Fundamental R&D results should be transformed into a public resource pool that all design bureaus can access. Competition will only occur at the system integration and overall solution level. The design bureau that achieves a technological breakthrough first can receive a larger budget incentive.

Finally, it breaks the unspoken rule that "every design bureau must have its own mass-produced model to survive."

This is the root of all vicious competition. The design bureau's funding and staffing should not be tied to "my tanks serving in the military," but rather to technological contributions and innovative output.

This is easier said than done, because it directly touches upon the vested interests that have been established over decades—the cities behind each design bureau depend on this factory for their livelihood.

Ogarkov hoped to establish a General Armaments Department under the Ministry of Defense, giving it true control over demand. The problem in the Soviet Union was the formation of alliances of interest among the various branches of the military and design bureaus, often rendering the Defense Industry Committee powerless. By centralizing management of the entire process of weapons and equipment evaluation, project initiation, and procurement through the General Armaments Department, at least the institutional design addressed the question of "who will act as the referee."

“Comrade Chief of the General Staff, this may mean the removal of many cadres.” Slava sighed and extended his hand.

“Comrade General Secretary, there has never been a reform without bloodshed. Besides, we already know where the problems lie, and we can change them. Why leave them to future generations?” Ogarkov shook hands with Slava and stood up.

This matter cannot be pushed forward by the General Staff Department alone. The design bureau's backers are in the interest chains of various republics, local party committees, and military industrial enterprises. Only the General Secretary's authority can bring these people together at the same table.

Slava stood up: "Alright. I'll handle this. You prepare the draft and give it to me within a month."

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

In August 1991, the General Armaments Department was finally established.

Previously, the creation of a new piece of equipment required going through these government departments: the National Defense Industry Commission was in charge of project approval, the General Staff Department proposed operational requirements, various design bureaus carried out research and development, factories of various republics were in charge of production, and the general bureaus of various services under the Ministry of National Defense were in charge of acceptance and deployment—five or six government departments each managed a segment, and the connection between each segment relied on coordination meetings and official documents.

What did the "Coordination Council" mean in the Soviet bureaucratic system? It meant that the bureaucratic machine needed some "necessary lubricant" to function.

The General Armaments Department was responsible for the entire process. It was in charge of the unified management of the Soviet Army's weapons and equipment, including demonstration, research and development, testing, type approval, procurement, deployment, and life-cycle support, from the moment a weapon system was on the drawing board until the day it was retired and scrapped.

It can directly coordinate the division of labor among various design bureaus, unify technical standards and interface specifications, and decide which projects to launch, which to merge, and which to cancel. Previously, these powers were scattered among five or six departments, but now they have been eliminated and centralized in one place.

The first thing the General Armaments Department did after its establishment was to formulate the tactical and technical requirements for the next generation of army equipment.

Based on the lessons learned from the Gulf War, information-based military thinking, and an analysis of the shortcomings of current Soviet equipment, the General Armaments Department put forward the requirements for the Soviet Union's fourth-generation main battle tank:

The frontal armor protection is equivalent to at least 1,000 millimeters of homogeneous steel. It is equipped with a new generation of explosive reactive armor and an active protection system that can intercept incoming rockets and anti-tank missiles before they hit.

In terms of firepower, it still uses the Soviet-era 125mm main gun. The key change is the adoption of an unmanned turret.

By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had several unmanned turret designs underway. Project 477 in Kharkiv went the furthest, featuring a 152mm gun, an unmanned turret, and a three-person crew all seated inside the vehicle. Project 195 in Nizhny Tagil was also exploring similar directions.

The size and frontal projection area of ​​the unmanned turret are greatly reduced, and the crew is concentrated inside the vehicle body, allowing for the design of a real armored compartment to protect the personnel; the ammunition is separated from the crew, and the secondary explosion no longer directly kills the crew—this is precisely the fatal flaw of the T-72 in actual combat.

In terms of fire control, all-weather, all-time combat capability is required. Thermal imaging and night vision sights, millimeter-wave radar assistance are also necessary. The vehicle commander must have an independent panoramic sight.

In terms of information technology, data equipment should be integrated into tanks, enabling each tank to exchange information in real time with higher command posts, neighboring units, and air platforms. Tank commanders should have battlefield situation display terminals that allow them to see the entire battlefield situation map, not just the small area in front of the gun barrel. GLONASS navigation for precise positioning and an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system should also be installed—to avoid friendly fire incidents that frequently occurred with the US military during the Gulf War.

In terms of power, it requires no less than 1200 horsepower. The maximum speed on the road is no less than 70 km/h. Under off-road conditions, it is no less than 45 km/h. Furthermore, the very fuel-consuming gas turbine engine of the T80 series was eliminated. The design bureau believed that diesel engine technology would advance rapidly, and hybrid power was to be developed. The diesel generator would drive the electric motor to rotate the turret, power the APS and sensors, and even reduce heat and noise signals by driving short distances in pure electric mode in a silent state.

This requirement was issued to all design bureaus and research institutions involved in the development of the next generation of tanks.

At the same time, there are also requirements for the development of the next generation of self-propelled artillery.

The Soviet Union's self-propelled artillery system was now facing a transition between the old and the new. The older 2S7M "Peony" was the heaviest self-propelled artillery piece in the Soviet Union, with a caliber of 203 mm and a range of over 35 kilometers. It entered service in the 1970s and was designed to strike tactical nuclear weapon sites, command posts, and airfields deep within NATO territory.

Peony can fire at a long distance and with great power, but it's old. Its fire control system lacks automated firing data calculation, its mobility is poor, and its level of informatization is practically zero.

As for the 2S19 "Msta," which only entered service in 1989, this 152mm howitzer is lighter, more mobile, has a higher rate of fire, and an automatic loader than the Peony. However, it lacks potential for information-based upgrades, and its fire control system is relatively weak. To integrate it into the "information-firepower integration" combat network envisioned by Ogarkov, it would require major modifications, and the cost of such modifications might not be much cheaper than building a new one.

The General Armaments Department determined that the Msta could continue to serve until around 2005. As the Peony was gradually retired from active service, the next generation of self-propelled artillery had to be designed according to information technology standards from the very beginning—incorporating data links, automatic fire control, ballistic computers, and battlefield situation terminals into the blueprints.

The development of the next generation of self-propelled artillery was decided to be handed over to an old project that was in trouble – Project 477.

Project 477, codenamed "Hammer," was launched by the Morozov Design Bureau in the early 1980s with the initial goal of developing a completely new next-generation main battle tank that was entirely different from the T-72/T-80.

Project 477 had enormous ambitions; it aimed to develop unmanned turrets—at that time, there wasn't a single unmanned turret tank in service anywhere in the world! It also planned to use a brand-new 152mm main gun.

This design concept seemed incredibly advanced in 1991, but an unmanned turret required an extremely reliable automatic loading system. If a shell jammed, no one inside the vehicle could manually troubleshoot the problem. The remote control system required a large number of sensors and computing power—Soviet microelectronics technology in the early 1980s could not support such complex system integration. The weight and recoil of the 152mm shell placed extremely high demands on the mechanical strength of the automatic loader.

So Project 477 ran from the 1980s to the 1990s, and it wasn't until 1991 that a prototype chassis was finally built—that's right, only the chassis was built! Some subsystems were also tested, but it never reached the finalized standard.

By the end of 1991, Project 477 was in a state of semi-death. The General Armaments Department decided to suspend the tank program of Project 477 because there was already a joint project with a unified platform for the next generation of tanks, and Morozov did not need to start from scratch.

However, the technologies accumulated by Project 477, especially the large-caliber automatic loading system, the remote control technology of the unmanned turret, and the 152mm ammunition system, should not be wasted.

The General Armaments Department believes that unmanned turrets are also very meaningful for use on self-propelled artillery. Self-propelled artillery does not need to engage in close combat like tanks. It fires from tens of kilometers away. Unmanned turrets can reduce the exposure of personnel to shells and ammunition and improve survivability.

In April 1992, after combining proposals from various design bureaus and completing preliminary technical demonstrations, the Soviet Union announced its development plan for the fourth-generation main battle tank.

Project code name: T95.

The Soviet Union leaked this information through an article in the technical journal of the Defense Industry Committee, which mentioned specific model names and performance specifications, as well as a timeline that seemed plausible.

It is said that the Soviet Union was researching the next generation of main battle equipment platforms for the army, with directions including new armor materials, active protection systems, information-based combat systems, and new power systems.

The news was quickly leaked to Washington by the KGB.

Pentagon analysts scrutinized the article from top to bottom. They searched for clues between the lines but found few details—the Soviet Union's intention was precisely to keep the Americans in a state of skepticism.

The White House now knows that the Soviet Union has decided to develop a new piece of equipment that is even better than the M1A1, and this signal cannot be ignored!

Washington, July 1992.

The U.S. Department of Defense announced the launch of a next-generation main battle tank development program. The project is named "Abrams X".

At the Pentagon press conference, the Department of Defense spokesperson used very cautious language:

"The Abrams X program is a forward-looking exploration of the U.S. Army's future armored forces, designed to ensure that the United States' technological advantage on the ground battlefield continues into the 21st century."

In layman's terms: The Soviet Union is developing fourth-generation tanks, and we can't afford not to.

The technical direction of the Abrams X, at least based on the publicly disclosed parts, highly overlaps with the direction in that Soviet article: new armor, active protection, information-based combat system, and new power system (the Americans are also exploring hybrid electric drive).

However, the Soviet Union was not only planning to intimidate the Americans with its army equipment. The General Armaments Department then announced new aircraft and a new large-scale naval construction plan.

It's just a battle of health bars, right? Now, America is the real challenger!

Chapter 128 Building a Blue-water Navy and Fifth-Generation Fighters

Moscow, August 1991

With the General Armaments Department just established, the Army's fourth-generation tank, the T95, is already on track, and now it's the Air Force's turn.

The Gulf War left a significant shadow on the Soviet Air Force. The lesson for the Army was that the T-72 "monkey version" was easily defeated by the fully-equipped Abrams of the Americans. However, that could at least be explained by the fact that "monkey version is not the same as the domestic version" and "a small loss is not a loss".

For the Air Force, however, this is a technical issue.

The stealth capabilities of American aircraft greatly shocked the Soviet Union. If Iraq hadn't acquired a batch of old-fashioned meter-wave radars from Iran and used them to shoot down two F-117s with box-type firing, the Soviet Air Force would probably have been terrified by the Americans.

Later, after Saddam Hussein was forced to crash his plane by the Soviet Union using Stinger missiles, and after Defense Minister Hailala became the next Iraqi president, both of the American F-117s that were shot down were sent back to the Soviet Union overnight for analysis.

Many people couldn't sleep that night when the F-117 flew over Baghdad. Later, every general in the Soviet Air Force watched the live broadcast. In the green night vision footage, Baghdad's anti-aircraft guns fired wildly into the sky, tracer rounds flew erratically in the night, but the American bombs still accurately hit target after target.

Iraq's air defense radar system suffered a complete collapse. The S-75, S-125, and S-200 air defense systems Iraq possessed were all Soviet-made. These were the Soviet Union's best export-grade air defense radars. What does this mean?

This means that if one day American planes were flying over Moscow, the Soviet Union's own air defense system might not be able to see them!

If the Americans were to widely apply this stealth technology, then US reconnaissance aircraft would be able to enter the Soviet Union with impunity, and the Allied military bases would have no secrets whatsoever!

Yes, the Soviet Union's own air defense systems were far superior to their export versions, and the S-300 outperformed Iraq's, but the F-117 wasn't America's most powerful stealth aircraft either.

The KGB's moles in the US obtained relevant intelligence, saying that the Americans were hiding something even more advanced in the Nevada desert. In addition to the B-2 "Spirit" stealth strategic bomber that debuted in 89, Boeing was developing a stealth fighter with the same code name as last year's F-22 "Raptor" after acquiring McDonnell Douglas. It is said that its radar cross-section is as large as a mosquito, and it has sacrificed a lot of maneuverability for stealth performance.

And look at the toys of the Soviet Air Force now...

The Air Force General Staff then convened a closed-door meeting with only one topic: the next step for the Soviet Air Force.

The discussion begins with the F117.

"The F117 is not a good aircraft. Its flight performance is very poor—subsonic, low maneuverability, small payload, no air-to-air capability, can only fly at night, and can only be safely deployed after the enemy's air defense system has been truly crippled. Its multifaceted shape sacrifices too much aerodynamic performance for stealth."

The Air Force's deputy commander stated, "But whether it's the F-117, the B-2, or the ATF, the Americans have proven that stealth technology is feasible. An aircraft can be made invisible to radar. The Americans won't stop at the level of the F-117, and we must catch up quickly."

He's right. Intelligence indicates that the United States is developing its next-generation fighter jet—the ATF program, which later became the F-22—combining stealth with supersonic speed and high maneuverability.

The United States’ fifth-generation fighter jets will pose a deadly threat to the Soviet Union’s existing fourth-generation main fighter jet family, the Su-27.

The Air Force has decided to take a two-pronged approach. The most urgent priority is to counter stealth technology and take passive countermeasures against the Americans, breaking their stealth capabilities!

The entire process of Iraq's incredible stroke of luck in shooting down an American plane greatly inspired Soviet scientists. The principle of stealth technology is to control the radar cross-section—through shape design and radar-absorbing materials, the radar waves hitting the aircraft are scattered in other directions or absorbed, preventing the radar receiver from receiving the echo.

However, this system has its physical limits.

Meter-wave radar operating in the VHF band is far more effective at detecting stealth aircraft than modern centimeter-wave radar. The shape optimization of stealth aircraft is designed for the centimeter-wave band; for the longer wavelengths of the meter wave, the effects of carefully designed angles and coatings are greatly reduced.

"We need to upgrade our meter-wave radar. We can't just follow Iraq's example and use the old radar as a makeshift solution; its accuracy is too poor. We need to develop a new generation of meter-wave phased array radar! Combining the anti-stealth capabilities of meter waves with the precision of phased arrays."

This is a technically feasible but very challenging direction in engineering—meter-wave antennas are large (because the antenna must be at least longer than the radar wavelength), and the signal processing of phased arrays is complex. Combining the two requires a lot of effort in antenna design and signal processing algorithms.

The Air Force has a significant need to upgrade its radar, but the radar on the Su-27 uses an outdated inverted Cassegrain antenna and mechanical scanning. Weighing nearly a ton, it has a detection range of only about 100 kilometers against targets the size of a typical fighter jet!

At this time, the Soviet Union did not allocate much budget to the air force. Although it had acquired a large number of real industries and technologies from Japan in 91, the Soviet Union was still helping its Eastern European allies pay off their debts. Military spending began to increase in 90, but the increased portion went to the navy instead of the air force.

The navy is more expensive than the air force. With the completion of the outfitting of the Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag and the launch of the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier equipped with catapults, the Soviet Navy was transforming from a navy that focused on nuclear submarines and missile forces into a blue-water navy with global influence and the ability to conduct long-range operations. The supporting fleet of destroyers, frigates and carrier-based aircraft cost a lot of money.

The navy is the most expensive branch of the military. If an army general breaks down a tank, he might as well punish himself with a drink. If an air force general crashes a large aircraft, he will be punished and demoted. But if the navy sinks an aircraft carrier... then the target for the next naval exercise can be reserved in advance.

Therefore, given the limited budget, the Air Force decided to cooperate with China on avionics and radar, and use the remaining money to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet.

The Soviet Union was not without stealth research. Major design bureaus such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev began preliminary research on stealth technology in the 1980s. Sukhoi developed the S-37 forward-swept wing demonstrator, while MiG developed the conceptual design of the 1.44 heavy fighter. These projects were at different stages at the time—some were drawing up plans, some were building wind tunnel models, and some were conducting materials testing.

PS: My supervisor's parents worked at the Antonov Design Bureau in Ukraine before the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, my supervisor visited the An-225 and even showed me a photo of himself with the An-225. Unfortunately, the Russo-Ukrainian War destroyed the last An-225 in the world.

Compared to the United States, the Soviet Union lagged behind in several key technologies.

The United States' stealth coating technology was at least half a generation ahead of the Soviet Union's. The Soviet Union's radar cross-section reduction factor was an order of magnitude worse than that of the United States. Even if the Soviet Union had obtained the wreckage of two F-117s, it did not mean that the Soviet Union could reverse engineer the manufacturing process of the coating.

In terms of computing power, the design of stealth aircraft requires extensive simulation calculations—every angle, edge, and air intake shape must undergo numerous radar reflection simulations on a computer. The Soviet Union's computing capabilities had improved due to the large-scale application of information technology, so further investment in this area was unnecessary.

The Soviet Union had plenty of experience in designing and building large-scale supercomputers after so many years of developing information technology.

Regarding engines, stealth aircraft engines require special infrared suppression measures, which the Soviet aircraft engine design bureau was still exploring.

"Therefore, the development of fifth-generation fighter jets cannot be left to each company to develop its own system, as was the case with fourth-generation fighters. The General Armaments Department already has experience with joint projects—the Army's fourth-generation tank was developed in this way, and the Air Force must do the same."

The Air Force ultimately had Sukhoi and MiG jointly compete for the fifth-generation heavy fighter jet. Each company submitted its own proposal, and the two companies compared and evaluated each other on key technical points. In the end, one company's proposal was selected as the main one, and the other company's superior technologies were integrated into it.

In late 1992, Sukhoi's Su-47 design won the bid, and MiG's technical team was integrated into Sukhoi's project. Prototype manufacturing was expected to begin in 1995, with the first flight in 1997 and small-batch deployment to elite units in 2003.

Later, the Navy joined the project in 1993 because the Ulyanovsk nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was expected to be outfitted and begin sea trials in 1994, and a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was also under construction, with electromagnetic catapults rumored to be developed in the future. The Navy hoped that a separate carrier-based version of the Su-47 could be designed to replace the currently adequate Su-33 and MiG-29K.

In December 1991, at the request of the Air Force, Slava decided to cooperate with China on the upgrade of the Su-27.

Several years after the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union sold the Su-27SK—an export version of the Su-27—to China. This was one of the most important arms sales projects after the warming of Sino-Soviet relations. After receiving the Su-27, China initially had a very high opinion of the aircraft—it was a generation ahead of any fighter jet in the Chinese Air Force at the time.

But the Chinese are not like the Indians. China is never satisfied with just buying finished products; what they want is technology. China must be independent and self-reliant! They want to create their own version.

With Slava's approval, the Soviet Union and China signed a joint development agreement. The framework was as follows:

The Soviet Union provided the basic platform and core technologies of the Su-27, such as engines and aerodynamic data, while China was responsible for the development of the avionics system.

China considers the Su-27 an excellent fourth-generation heavy fighter jet—with long range and high maneuverability, its air combat performance is comparable to, and even better than, the American F-15 in some aspects. However, the Gulf War exposed a common weakness of the Su-27 and the entire Soviet fourth-generation fighter jet fleet—avionics and information systems.