Eagle, I don't want to form an alliance anymore.

Following Khrushchev's report, calls began within the Hungarian Party to rehabilitate Rakosi. In July 1956, Khrushchev dismissed Rákosi, fearing he would become a powder keg, but his successor, Elno Gros, was almost a carbon copy of Rákosi, and social discontent continued to build.

On October 6, Hungary held a state funeral and reburial ceremony for Lajk, attended by more than 200,000 people, and the atmosphere resembled a political rally.

Keep in mind that Hungary's population was only a few million at that time, so this number was already terrifying.

On October 23, students from the Budapest University of Technology took to the streets in solidarity with Poland. By evening, the demonstration had grown into a mass rally of hundreds of thousands of people, who put forward sixteen demands, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, and the return of Imre Nagy to power.

That evening, shootings broke out in Reichstag Square and in front of the radio station. Someone fired into the crowd, and Soviet troops returned fire, and that's how the incident began.

Who is Nagy? Imre Nagy is a veteran communist who went into exile in Moscow in the 1930s. He implemented moderate reforms during his first term as prime minister in 1953, but was ousted by Rakosi and expelled from the party in 1955. In the atmosphere of October 1956, he was the only figure within the party with both orthodox experience and a reformist image, and was seen as the only one who could potentially salvage the situation.

On October 24, Nagy regained his position as Prime Minister, but things had already spiraled out of his control. "Revolutionary Committees" and "Workers' Committees" were established throughout Hungary—direct democratic bodies spontaneously organized by workers, almost identical in form to the Soviets in Russia in 1917!

This was the most embarrassing ideological event for the Soviet Union. Hungarian secret police were lynched by the crowd, and the party symbol was cut off from the national flag. That Hungarian flag with a hole cut in the middle later became the symbol of the revolution.

On October 28, Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest for the first time, seemingly bringing the conflict to a close. On October 30, Najib announced the end of the one-party system and the restoration of a multi-party coalition government.

On November 1, he made that fatal decision—to announce Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declare neutrality, and seek help from the United Nations.

This move has put Moscow in a corner.

Khrushchev was hesitant, but Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was strategically intolerable—the Warsaw Pact was only established in 1955, and the TMD had a member state withdrawing the following year, causing the entire system to fall apart!

In the early hours of November 4, the Soviet army launched Operation Cyclone, a large-scale invasion of Hungary.

This is where Kadar's story gets complicated.

John Kadar came from a working-class family, joined the Communist Party in 1931, and participated in the underground resistance in his home country during World War II.

After the war, he was a representative of the local faction within the party—distinguished from the "Moscow faction" like Rákosi and Gro, who had returned from Moscow. In 1951, Rákosi needed to overthrow the opposition within the party, so he arrested Kádár, imprisoned him, and tortured him to force him to confess to being a "Tito spy."

Kadar spent three years in prison, during which time his fingernails were reportedly pulled out one by one, until he was exonerated and released in 1954.

This prison experience is crucial to understanding Kádár's later behavior; he was a victim of the Rakosi terror and harbored a deep-seated hatred for the Stalinist repression.

In the October 1956 revolution, he initially sided with Najib and joined Najib's interim government as the first secretary of the newly formed Socialist Workers' Party (a new party name intended to sever ties with the old party).

Then he betrayed them.

Late on November 1, Kádár disappeared from Budapest. He was taken to Soviet military headquarters by the Soviets and then flown to Moscow. Khrushchev hoped to support the Hungarian Loyalists, so he met with the Soviet Politburo in Moscow.

On November 3, Kádár made his choice—to agree to lead a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government" back to Hungary under the escort of Soviet bayonets.

On November 4, the same day Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, Qatar's "new government" was established in Solnok, which was under Soviet control.

Why did Kádár make this choice? This has been debated repeatedly throughout history. The most mainstream explanation is that Kádár believed the revolution was out of control, that the multi-party system and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact would turn Hungary into a second Spain (referring to the Spanish Civil War in 1936), and that a Soviet invasion was inevitable. Therefore, it was better for a "not so bad" communist to take over than for a Stalinist like Rákosi or a pure puppet.

This statement may have some merit in itself; Kadar is indeed more moderate than Lakosi, but this assessment still cannot explain what he did to Naji.

After the revolution was suppressed, Nagy and his colleagues fled to the Yugoslav embassy seeking asylum. On November 22, the Qatari government issued them a written guarantee that they could safely leave the embassy and return home without being prosecuted.

Najib believed the assurance and left the embassy.

As a result, he was kidnapped by Soviet KGB agents as soon as he stepped out the door and taken to Romania along with his family for imprisonment.

Qatar's written guarantee became worthless.

接下来是18个月的秘密审判。1958年6月15日，纳吉被以叛国罪判处死刑，6月16日凌晨绞死。

Najib refused to ask for clemency during his trial, and his final statement was secretly recorded. The gist of it was:

"I tried twice to save socialism and my people. The first time was in 1953 when I was stopped by Rakosi, and the second time was in 1956 when I was suppressed by the Soviet army."

If I were to ask for forgiveness now, it would be tantamount to admitting that my work was wrong.

I would rather let the people's court ultimately decide my case and wait for the moment when my reputation is restored.

This passage later circulated and became the bible of the opposition.

The executions were particularly brutal. After Naji and Maletaire were hanged, their bodies were wrapped in asphalt paper and thrown into section 301 of the "New Cemetery" on the outskirts of Budapest—a wasteland specifically for burying political prisoners, unmarked and without tombstones, buried only by numbers.

Kádár later even forbade their families from knowing the burial site, and Nagy's wife and daughter were exiled to a small town in northern Hungary and were forbidden from using Nagy's surname for many years.

Why did Qatar do this?

The international situation in 1958 no longer demanded the execution of Nagy. The Soviet Union's attitude on the matter was ambiguous. Khrushchev preferred long-term imprisonment rather than execution because he himself opposed Stalin's policies.

But the most widely accepted explanation for Qatar's execution of Naji is that as long as Naji is alive, Qatar's legitimacy will always be a question.

As long as Nagy is alive in some prison cell, the Hungarians have a “real leader” waiting to return.

Najib must die! Only then can Khadar begin his own reign!

This execution will become an open secret in Hungary. Nagy's execution was announced at the time, but the burial site and trial details were kept strictly confidential.

An entire generation of Hungarians knew that Nagy had been hanged, but were not allowed to talk about it. This state of "everyone knows but cannot speak out" is the most corrosive—it allows the entire society's public discourse to be built on a lie.

The problem is that Qatar did do quite well after 1958.

After executing Nagy, Kádár gradually loosened control: in 1962 he declared that "the class struggle had ended," in 1963 he granted amnesty to most of the political prisoners imprisoned in 1956, and in 1968 he launched a new economic mechanism. Hungarians enjoyed one of the highest living standards in Eastern Europe, were allowed to travel abroad, and had relatively relaxed restrictions on cultural products.

This means that every Hungarian is enjoying this "prosperity built on Nagy's corpse." You are doing well because someone died for you, because the revolution was suppressed, and because you accepted silence as the price.

Hungarians have a word to describe this state: "a legvidámabb barakk," the happiest barracks. This self-mockery itself is a manifestation of trauma.

The place where Najib is buried, namely Block 301, will forever remain in Qatar's sight. In that wasteland of the new cemetery lie Najib, Maletair, Jimesh, and more than 260 other people who were executed in 1956.

Throughout the 1960s-1980s, laying flowers there was a political act that would be recorded by the secret police, but people still went!

People always secretly leave bouquets there; this place represents the conscience of many.

Kádár could not offer any explanation for this, because the "counter-revolutionary" designation of 1956 was the cornerstone of the party's legitimacy, and the official narrative of the Hungarian party had to be:

1956 was a counter-revolutionary riot, the Soviet invasion was internationalist aid, and the Qatari government was a hero who saved socialism.

Once this narrative falters, the legitimacy of the entire party collapses—hence the prohibition of any discussion or reassessment for the past thirty years.

But society knows the truth, the Party knows society knows, and the Party also knows that society knows the Party knows...

Kadar's conscience had been tormented for over thirty years, and he finally broke down in his later years.

In the late 1980s, Kádár's mental state deteriorated significantly, and he began to repeatedly mention Nagy in private. In May 1989, the Hungarian Party decided to hold a state funeral for Nagy on June 16—the 31st anniversary of his execution.

Kadar had by then been dismissed from his post and was seriously ill in bed.

On July 6, 1989, the same day the Supreme Court officially announced the exoneration of Najib and the revocation of the original verdict, Khadar died in the hospital.

The Hungarians have said ever since: Nagy's ghost waited for him for thirty-one years.

Historically, in January 1989, Božogáj suddenly said in a radio interview that "1956 was a people's uprising, not a counter-revolutionary riot." This statement triggered a split within the Hungarian Communist Party, which dissolved six months later.

The sheer power of this trigger point can be seen here: a single sentence caused the collapse of 31 years of official narrative, leading to the direct disintegration of the Party.

"I'm not asking you to deny the actions of the Soviet army back then," Slava made it very clear. "It was something that had to be done under the specific historical conditions at the time in order to defend socialism. But today we can give a fairer account of 1956."

He looked into Kadar's eyes.

"It should no longer be simply called a 'counter-revolutionary riot.' Its true nature is that the Party made the mistake of becoming detached from the masses, which aroused the legitimate dissatisfaction of the people. This dissatisfaction was exploited by a small group of counter-revolutionaries, ultimately causing serious damage."

More than thirty years later, Moscow has decided to redefine this.

Kadar abruptly raised his head and stared at Slava. He could no longer walk the path of a repressor, burdened with the infamy of the ages; he could gracefully bow out as someone who had corrected historical mistakes.

Then he can go see Najib.

“This matter can be led by the Party, and by Comrade Kadar himself,” Slava said slowly. “At least it is much better than letting it be brought up by those outside the Party and cause a huge uproar someday. We have given the people the justice they want; but the system itself needs to be improved, not overthrown. We must keep this balance in our own hands.”

Kadar remained silent for a long time before finally nodding slowly.

The old man, who had held power for thirty-one years, seemed to have unloaded a tremendous burden at this moment, or perhaps he had received a final entrustment.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

In the following days, the personnel of the Hungarian Party were rearranged.

Qatar announced his retirement, retaining only a nominal title such as honorary chairman. Gross took over as general secretary, having always been a candidate to succeed him.

After being sidelined for thirteen years, Nersh re-entered the Politburo. As for the young Nemet, he was promoted to a high position in charge of the economy, to oversee the specific implementation of the computerization plan.

As for the organized opposition groups outside the party, Slava's solution is to divide and conquer. Forceful suppression won't work; Hungarian society is too loosely integrated, and any attempt to suppress it will only lead to an explosion.

Slava really didn't want to solve all problems with violence, because that would create path dependency, and in the end the Soviet Union would only be destroyed by stronger violence.

Slava can give some space to moderate nationalists and absorb some of their demands regarding national culture and rural issues, but he must strictly block those pro-Western liberals—especially by cutting off their funding from Western foundations.

Slava hardly had to do anything about this – the West was mired in the Great Depression, and its major investors were struggling to survive themselves. All he had to do was push the trend forward.

One delegation after another came and went, while the pieces on the chessboard were being placed one by one into their respective positions.

Chapter 82 Some blood must be shed early.

During the conference, Slava worked tirelessly, diagnosing and prescribing treatments for each of the Warsaw Pact countries with varying degrees of illness.

When it came to Bulgaria and Romania, he didn't invite them into the living room for a long talk as he had with East Germany and Hungary—one didn't require much verbal explanation, and the other couldn't be resolved by simply discussing it at the table.

Sigrún has taught at the Iceland University of the Arts as a part-time lecturer since and was Dean of the Department of Fine Art from -. In – she held a research position at Reykjavík Art Museum focusing on the role of women in Icelandic art. She studied fine art at the Icelandic College of Arts and Crafts and at Pratt Institute, New York, and holds BA and MA degrees in art history and philosophy from the University of Iceland. Sigrún lives and works in Iceland.

Let's start with Bulgaria.

This was the least troublesome one for the Soviet Union among all the Warsaw Pact members, so much so that even Slava himself felt a bit amused and exasperated.

The General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Zhivkov, is 76 years old. He has been in power since 1954—the longest he has ever held office in the entire communist world, a full 33 years.

He came to power during the Stalin era, outlasted Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev, and now he faces Ivanov, who is much younger than him.

Zhivkov witnessed the entire process of the Soviet Union's rise and fall.

This old man's philosophy of governance can be summed up in five words: Follow Moscow closely!

Basically, whenever the Soviet Union introduced a reform policy, Bulgaria would immediately adopt it within a few months, but then came Zhivkov's wisdom—he only learned the basics.

Bulgaria under Zhivkov was an agricultural-light industrial country. It underwent several rounds of reforms in the 1980s, but these were all imitative.

In July 1987, Zhivkov announced the "July Concept" reform plan—basically imitating Slava's reform rhetoric, but without specific content. Under his rule, the country's economy was stable, foreign debt was low, and the standard of living was moderate within the Warsaw Pact, without the kind of crisis seen in Hungary or Poland.

Bulgaria was jokingly referred to as the "sixteenth constituent republic of the Soviet Union"—in 1963, Zhivkov even publicly proposed that Bulgaria be incorporated into the Soviet Union, but Moscow politely turned it down, saying that his flattery was too much.

Therefore, Slava has no need to worry at all that Zhivkov will resist him.

On the contrary, what he was worried about was that the old man would be overly compliant.

If Moscow says go east, Sofia will never go west; whatever Slava pushes, Zhivkov immediately follows suit.

The secret to this old man's 30 years of longevity lies in the ten words: "following on the surface, but remaining unchanged in essence"—Gorbachev called for openness, and he followed suit, but Bulgaria did not loosen its stance on the issue in the slightest.

Gorbachev called for reform, and Bulgaria echoed his call for reform, but Bulgaria's state-owned enterprises remained the same lifeless state-owned enterprises.

Now it's Slava's turn to deal with this stubborn pest.

The key to dealing with this kind of person is to get Zhivkov to actually do something, rather than just putting on a show of compliance.

So Slava summoned Zhivkov directly:

"The alliance intends to promote its economic model to members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and given Bulgaria's relatively mature agricultural and light industry sectors, some areas can be selected as pilot sites for reform."

Slava designated Bulgaria as the first pilot city for a computerized planned economy outside the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria is a small country; in 1987, its GDP was only around 50 billion US dollars, one-twentieth of that of the Soviet Union. Its economic structure was simple, and the party had strong control—making it an ideal testing ground!

Slava's order was thus issued: deploy a more advanced version of the information system currently designed by the Academy of Sciences to the Sofia test zone, making Bulgaria's economy the first "external validation case" of the Soviet model.

As for why it's not deployed domestically? Because the resistance is too great to deploy it.

The Soviet Union's massive and bloated bureaucratic system and rigid planning system were too difficult to shake. With the gradual advancement of informatization and the maturity of economic automation management systems, the black box of power on which Soviet bureaucrats depended for their livelihood would inevitably be destroyed, and the power of various ministries to allocate resources would begin to shrink. What would the vast majority of cadres think?

Even the best policies need to be implemented. When a good policy inevitably harms the interests of most of the people involved in its implementation, it will inevitably be distorted into a bad policy!

Current information technology reforms—even before Slava has even touched upon economic automation management—have already encountered significant resistance.

The best information technology department in the Union is now the agricultural department. On the one hand, Slava was a former secretary of the agricultural department, and on the other hand, the Soviet Union's agricultural ministry did not have much power and was ranked very low in terms of priority for obtaining central government materials. It was a "clean department" with not much to gain.

Therefore, most of the information nodes, computing centers, and data terminals that Slava is vigorously promoting in the alliance are centered around the agricultural production and research consortium built in the region.

From collective farms responsible for grain production, to related enterprises providing agricultural workers with mechanized equipment, fertilizers, and integrated agricultural product processing and transportation services, to research institutes engaged in research and guiding production activities, and then to universities providing talent for these institutes...

This agricultural research and development consortium has gradually matured. Terminals are deployed in factories to upload production data to information nodes, while the computing center compares the data and compiles reports under the adjustment of cybernetics algorithms to adjust production allocation activities. However, the system still has problems with automatic allocation, and it is estimated that scientists, mathematicians and technologists will need to study the cybernetics algorithms more carefully.

After the computing nodes have processed the data, this production data is sent to higher-level nodes and reported layer by layer to the Moscow Central Committee, which then adjusts the quarterly targets based on this production data.

Indeed, with the advancement of information technology reforms, the Moscow Central Committee has been able to adjust the frequency of planned targets from annually to quarterly. If it weren't for the fact that agricultural production must respect natural laws and cannot produce a fixed amount of grain every month like industrial assembly lines, the central ministries could even change the frequency of target adjustments to monthly!

Many reformist cadres now believe that since the Soviet Union has solved its immediate food problem, could it try to grow more fruits and vegetables, especially fast-growing, high-yield vegetables, to enrich the dining tables of the Soviet people?

After eating canned food for so long, the Soviet people must have been very happy to suddenly have some fresh vegetables in their mouths.

To take a more radical approach, perhaps the central government could relax some of its management pressure, allowing local agricultural production and research consortia to produce fruits and vegetables for cities within their coverage area and adjust production according to the needs of those cities.

After all, the Soviet Union's infrastructure was really bad, and the transportation losses alone were a huge waste. Before the infrastructure was built up, there was no need for the central government to remotely allocate those non-staple foods that were not easy to store—the vegetables would rot anyway after the allocation, so it was better to just hand the matter over to the local party secretaries.