Starting from the deputy company commander of the Soldier Assault Team

When Zhang Anbang mentioned the Gulf War, everyone's expressions became more serious. The people present had studied the Gulf War extensively, both in meetings and in private, and their expressions naturally changed upon hearing it.

Zhang Anbang ignored these comments and continued, "Three of the characteristics are particularly prominent and are the core directions that armies of various countries are vying to learn from and study."

First, precise point-to-point strikes.

In the early stages of the war, hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from a distance to strike Iraqi radar stations and command centers, while F-117 stealth fighters precisely destroyed air defense nodes on a single aircraft.

No longer relying on carpet bombing to cover the positions, it completely breaks away from the traditional firepower area kill mode.

Second, large-scale multi-route maneuvering.

Operation Left Hook, a classic ground warfare maneuver, saw the US 7th Armored Corps and 18th Airborne Corps launch a deep flanking maneuver on the western front, a frontal pincer movement on the eastern front, and a feint amphibious operation at sea, simultaneously deploying multiple attack routes to form a multi-pronged encirclement.

Third, multi-point collaborative control of the entire domain.

Sustained air strikes, armored vehicle infiltration, special operations forces behind enemy lines, and long-range naval strikes were all launched simultaneously, with multi-domain forces working together to suppress the Iraqi army's overall defense system.

Similarly, in a war, one cannot only look at the victors but also the vanquished. The U.S. military's overwhelming actions exposed the weakness of the Iraqi army's large-scale, concentrated deployment, which made them vulnerable to long-range firepower.

This is very important. As a military, I think we should not only consider the issue of attack, but also the issue of what happens after being attacked.

Personally, I believe that our newly formed digital pilot battalion should anticipate future battlefield risks in advance during the initial stages of its construction.

Modern local wars break out at a rapid pace and have a high probability of sudden conflict. The opponent's first wave of precision strikes often targets our heavy equipment clusters and command hubs.

We cannot only focus on how to launch proactive attacks; we must also possess the practical ability to quickly regroup and launch sustained counterattacks after being attacked by enemy fire or having our systems damaged.

Combining the inherent tactics of our army's infantry with the theoretical basis of dispersed deployment and concentrated firepower mentioned in the two books, Joint Operations Concept 2010 and Network-Centric Warfare.

I think we should focus on refining tactics involving small groups, multiple routes, and distributed maneuverability.

This means breaking down heavy armor, firepower, and reconnaissance capabilities into modular groups with complete reconnaissance, strike, and support capabilities, just like traditional infantry.

During combat, they are deployed in a dispersed manner to avoid the risk of large clusters being wiped out by long-range precision fire.

Relying on digital real-time data links, each unit can coordinate autonomously, maneuver in multiple routes to conceal themselves during maneuvers, and quickly converge firepower to strike targets when encountering them.

It was very evident during the Gulf War that all Iraqi armored units were densely clustered together to defend the lines and advance in groups, with their positions and marching columns being extremely distinctive.

The US military used Tomahawk missiles, stealth fighters, and long-range artillery to eliminate them one by one, and they were powerless to fight back when large ground forces advanced.

I have privately analyzed and reconstructed the battle many times. If the Iraqi army had taken the initiative to break up its main heavy armored force and deployed small armored units at the battalion and company levels in a dispersed and tiered manner, I would have believed that the Iraqi army would have taken the initiative to break up its main heavy armored force and deployed it in a dispersed and tiered manner.

Relying on the mobile maneuvering of the desert positions, each squad independently went forward to conduct reconnaissance, mutually restrained and harassed each other, and did not concentrate a large number of armored equipment in the same area to expose it to the enemy's precision strike.

Even if there is a generational gap in equipment between the two sides and a complete imbalance in air power, it can still significantly prolong the pace of the multinational forces' ground advance and slow down the opponent's offensive speed, and will not collapse completely in just a hundred hours of ground warfare.

Objectively speaking, the Iraqi army at that time did not have an integrated tactical data link, lacked command terminals that could communicate in real time across the entire domain, and its hardware system could not support distributed operations at all.

Even if the troops are forcibly split up, the various small groups cannot share battlefield intelligence in a synchronized manner. They can only fight independently and be attacked in isolation, and cannot give full play to the tactical advantages of dispersed deployment.

However, the situation is completely different now. We have explored the initial digital framework, but the data protocols of various types of equipment are not yet unified, and there are barriers to information exchange.

However, judging from the trend of technological development, problems such as data compatibility and global networking will only develop faster and faster in the future, and these problems will become easier to overcome.

Therefore, I believe that exploring and refining small-group, multi-route, distributed maneuver tactics should also be incorporated into the core direction of our digital pilot battalion's efforts to achieve breakthroughs.

As soon as he finished speaking, Gao Shijun led the applause.

After a pause of six or seven seconds, Gao Shijun spoke up, "So, the tactics you proposed that are suitable for our new pilot combined arms unit are what you just mentioned."

In summary, this involves point-to-point precision strikes, multi-point coordinated control of the field, multi-path maneuvering, small-group multi-path, and distributed maneuvering systems.

"Yes, Commander."

"Haha," Gao Shijun laughed, "You speak clearly, dare to tell the truth, and have a long-term vision. You are really good in this respect."

I've heard that you never fight unprepared battles. Since you've said it so bluntly, you must have other ideas.

"No need to beat around the bush, just say it directly: how do you plan to modify or build it? What kind of cooperation is needed from various departments? Explain everything clearly."

Hearing this, Zhang Anbang smiled, his expression slightly embarrassed. Judging from the army commander's expression when he spoke, someone had definitely had a deep conversation with him about himself.

It wasn't a formal chat like you'd have at work; it was more like a private conversation, where they just said whatever came to mind. I'm guessing it was either Uncle Wang or Uncle Li. Anyway, Lao Gao definitely gave him face by saying that.

Pulling himself back to reality, Zhang Anbang's expression turned serious as he spoke directly, "Yes, Commander, esteemed leaders, my core development strategy can be summed up in just twelve words: 'Don't change the hardware, reconstruct the software; don't modify the equipment, reshape the system.'"

Based on existing outdated equipment, the practical capabilities of the first-generation digital system are significantly enhanced through underlying logic optimization, algorithm reconstruction, and protocol integration.

First, I will independently develop a lightweight data conversion middleware to unify the data protocols of all combat units across the entire battalion, thus completely breaking down information silos.

It enables real-time data exchange, automatic coordinate synchronization, and one-click situation sharing among reconnaissance, firepower, armor, support, and air defense data.

By eliminating all manual transcription and verbal reporting processes, the response efficiency to detected attacks can be increased by approximately 60% to 70%.

Secondly, to address the communication shortcomings of narrow bandwidth and high packet loss, incremental transmission, layered compression, and segmented verification algorithms were developed.

It enables simultaneous voice and data transmission and dynamic incremental updates, establishes a simple dynamic relay network, solves the problem of lost connection in mountainous and complex terrains, and improves communication stability in complex electromagnetic environments.

Furthermore, a simplified automated combat support module is incorporated to enable automatic calculation of fire control parameters, automatic correction of meteorological elevation, and automatic calculation of battle damage and losses.

The previous ten-minute manual calculation process has been compressed to tens of seconds or even a few seconds, initially forming a rapid kill loop of detection, location, push notification, and strike.

At the same time, the vehicle-mounted situational awareness system was optimized, redundant procedures were removed, and targets were categorized and labeled, allowing commanders to clearly see the core battlefield situation at a glance.