Taiping Dao at the end of the Han Dynasty

Chapter 93: Carving on a Needle – The Most Exquisite and Profound Confucian Reform

"From policy proposal to implementation, this is the most crucial link in governance, requiring executors at all levels from top to bottom. Without breaking the cultural monopoly of the aristocratic families, especially powerful clans, and without circumventing these aristocratic classes from the central government to local levels, it's impossible to weaken their interests and establish a new system. Without its own core implementers, even the most draconian methods of governance will struggle to institutionally weaken the powerful clans; they will only foster new ones. In short, without changing the implementation structure and administrative monopoly, any slogan of equality will be absorbed by local powerful clans and wealthy families, and even exploited by them, solidifying into new aristocratic cliques."

"This is the administration's problem of 'orders being issued but not carried out, or orders being issued but not followed for long.' In practice, the heads of prefectures and counties were rotated from outside, while the assistants, village heads, clerks, and other officials who carried out the orders were mostly students or former subordinates of local prominent families. The recommendation system, the appointment of officials, the Imperial Academy, and public opinion were all 'controlled' by these officials. As a result, orders such as land surveys, land registers, and measures to suppress land annexation were often rendered ineffective at the technical stages of 'measuring, verifying contracts, and determining grades.' Meanwhile, cultural legitimacy was in the hands of the gentry: the Confucian scholars, the Imperial Academy Chancellor, the prefectural and county school officials, and the network of public opinion determined 'who was virtuous.' Without their evaluation, there was no path to officialdom; only those who followed their evaluation were considered 'upright.' This was the 'cultural monopoly' of powerful families."

"The two most crucial points can be summarized as 'who raises the measuring stick' and 'who recommends the people.' 'Who raises the measuring stick' refers to the measurement, quotas, contracts, and granary records. If these technical and numerical bases for governance are in the hands of local powerful families and magnates, they will inevitably become tools for their own self-interest. 'Who recommends the people' refers to the entry point for talent recruitment. If it is still based on the recommendation and public opinion system, with the gentry evaluating candidates, all reforms will be reversed at the personnel stage."

"The failure of Wang Mang's reforms lay in the fact that although he obtained central government decrees, he lacked a grassroots execution force that was loyal to the central government and could be paid regularly. His reforms also bypassed powerful clans and ordinary people, thus lacking a stable support base. Ultimately, all the reforms backfired, the government collapsed, the Xin Dynasty fell, and Wang Mang became a usurper."

"The ferocity of our Yellow Turban Rebellion can destroy the old, corrupt order. But the establishment of a new order requires a governing body that can 'manage accounts, collect taxes, and bring peace to the people.' If these governing bodies are still composed of scions of powerful families and gentry, then the situation will reverse, turning into another form of the Cao Wei regime. And the Nine-Rank System of powerful families and the Wei-Jin aristocratic clans will be just around the corner."

Zhang Chengfu knelt at the table, his charcoal pencil dancing like a dragon on the yellow paper, writing faster than Xun You and Xun Yu opposite him. The great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang's account of the realities of the late Han Dynasty, as recorded, analyzed, experienced, and concluded, appeared in completely different ways in the hands of the three. Because his simplified handwriting was crude and difficult to understand, the Xun family members were either curious or disdainful, but none of them noticed the hidden meaning within it. Only the great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang carefully observed this young man from the Way of Peace for a while, remaining frank and outspoken, continuing to explain the Confucian reform strategies.

"The reality of this world is 'heavy taxes, disasters, bankruptcies, and land consolidation.' To restore order, the tax burden on ordinary people must be reduced to a manageable level; hidden populations and concealed landholdings must be included in a tax system that is both taxable and acceptable; harsh levies must be replaced with fair taxes to reduce official corruption; and violence must be replaced with propriety to maintain peace in the countryside. To reform the corrupt practices of this world and implement this entire strategy, we cannot rely on greedy and despicable officials; we can only rely on upright and virtuous officials!"

"If we rely on the political faction and the local gentry to govern, and rely on the officials of the prefectures and counties, the county magistrates and assistant magistrates, and the local gentry, we cannot carry out violent equalization of wealth, we cannot harm the interests of these implementers too much, we cannot harm the gentry as a whole, and we cannot be too hasty and make enemies of too many gentry at once."

"In my humble opinion, the first step in improving the imperial court's fiscal and tax system is to 'measure and verify land ownership' to rebuild the tax base. Land ownership should not be easily altered. Obtaining accurate data on population and land ownership is already a great achievement. The investigation of hidden households and those registered as migrants should not be carried out by force; those registered should be exempted from one to three years of tax calculation and supplementary taxation. The measurement of land used for tax evasion under false names should be handled leniently, allowing for name changes and proper registration in exchange for three years of taxation at the old rate, without retroactive application. The creation of a 'one land, one contract' register requires the joint endorsement of representatives of the gentry and county officials, both to ensure credibility and to ensure acceptance by the local powerful clans."

"We cannot easily target powerful clans; the main objective of land surveys should be focused on the scattered local strongmen. Even so, we must minimize direct conflicts with them, using 'rectification of name, reduction of burden, and exchange for compliance' as bargaining chips. The personnel responsible for inspection and enforcement will be drawn from Imperial Academy students, county students, and local recommended scholars by the Prefectural Clerk."

"In addition to increasing the tax base through land surveys, the second measure is 'reduction and exemption of miscellaneous taxes,' abolishing local exorbitant levies and taxes, restoring the annual fixed tax of 120 coins, poll tax of 23 coins, and corvée tax of 300 coins, with further reductions as appropriate. For those registered in disaster-stricken areas, corvée tax will be waived or reduced by half that year. The prefect will publicly recruit laborers to avoid large-scale conscription. The salt monopoly will be halted to alleviate the hardships of ordinary people's lives."

"The reduction or exemption of these taxes must be agreed upon by the central government and the local prefectures and kingdoms. The reduction must be done gradually so that the local prefectures and kingdoms can accept it. Only if the first two items, 'land survey and registration' and 'reduction or exemption of miscellaneous taxes,' can a reliable core team be organized to 'suppress land annexation.'"

The great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang spoke in a deep, resonant voice, as if bearing the weight of Mount Tai. Every word he uttered at this moment was the culmination of decades of experience in bureaucracy, a testament to the conscience of a great Confucian scholar. To reform the system from within, it must be done step by step, cautiously, carefully controlling the timing and the degree of pressure. This is because it requires the ruling class, which has already seized power, to relinquish some of its benefits to the people. This is perhaps the most difficult thing to do in the world, the most complex and profound "reform" in Confucian governance.

"To 'suppress land annexation,' we must proceed with gentle persuasion, first with courtesy, then with force. Looking at the methods of previous dynasties, they were essentially three: 'tax contracts, tax reductions, and bestowal of titles,' used to gain the cooperation of the gentry, especially powerful clans. For the estates of powerful clans and wealthy families, those willing to have their tenants registered as ordinary citizens and pay regular taxes were granted new contracts and tax reductions. Clans that completed the 'conversion of hidden households to registered households' and 'conversion of registered land contracts' were rewarded with a 'village monument of righteousness' and a rank of nobility. This nobility could also offset corvée labor and atone for sins." "Only after these two preferential treatments have won over eight or nine tenths of the gentry and wealthy families can we forcibly seize the land and population of the remaining one or two tenths, those stubborn wealthy families who 'refuse to be officially registered and gather followers to commit violence.' In governing a country, bloodshed, especially against powerful families, should be a last resort, only used when all benevolence and righteousness have been exhausted."

"Furthermore, the 'relief granary loan' for years of disaster and plague requires the most governing ability and is the most difficult to implement. The strategy of counties and kingdoms using the old reserves of the imperial granary and the grain donated by powerful families to relieve the people, with loans in spring and repayments in autumn, and tax reductions in disaster years, sounds easy, but once implemented at the local level, it often leads to numerous abuses. Local officials are greedy and profit-driven, often going against the policies of the court, forcing people to borrow money and then collecting it at high interest rates, taking advantage of disaster years to engage in large-scale land annexation. To give the people of disaster years a way to survive, I'm afraid we still have to rely on benevolent and righteous clans to take in the refugees! Hmm, you said to hire disaster victims to build water conservancy projects? Maintaining order among the disaster victims is not an easy task! However, your Taiping Dao is good at talking about ghosts and gods, and also good at disaster relief, so perhaps it can be done."

"To supervise the implementation of local policies, 'public opinion supervision' is necessary. The county schools—where public opinion hearings are held in villages and towns, with the participation of elders, filial and incorrupt officials, and literary clerks—to examine the conduct of officials. Then, the performance evaluation of officials in the prefectures and counties should be reaffirmed, incorporating 'land surveying,' 'taxation,' 'equalization,' and 'disaster relief' into the annual evaluation of officials with a salary of two thousand shi (a unit of grain), and linking it to the quota for recommending filial and incorrupt officials. Only by using the 'recommendation quota,' which is most valued by local gentry, can their implementation be secured. Yes, you're right, this is 'compromise.' A compromise between the central government and local authorities, a compromise between the court and powerful families and local magnates."

The great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang raised his white eyebrows, occasionally exchanging a few words with Zhang Chengfu, who had spoken up to ask questions. This discussion of the Way had taken on a lecturing quality, recounting Xun Shuang's own principles. And his audience wasn't for the Way of Great Peace, but for the Xun family disciples who were also diligently studying. After finishing this practical explanation, he looked again at the Great Teacher Zhang Jiao and leisurely concluded.

"Master Zhang, to reform the corrupt practices of the realm, there are 'three nos and one practice.' First, we must not confront powerful clans head-on, but rather use prestige and benefits to obtain 'the return of hidden households to the register and the proper registration of names.' Second, we must not harass the common people with exorbitant taxes, but replace temporary levies with stable, year-round tax rates. Temporary levies are most easily manipulated and abused by petty officials. Third, we must not use relief loans as instruments of punishment, but rather provide opportunities for disaster victims to work and cultivate the land through public loans, deferred taxation, and employment by powerful clans. Finally, we must transform public opinion for the sake of reputation into clear performance evaluations, so that good governance can be measured and used for rewards and punishments—what you call 'achievements in practice.'"

The great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang spoke frankly for a long time, while the great wise teacher Zhang Jiao appeared deep in thought, occasionally offering a few words of response. Zhang Chengfu, standing nearby, had a keen eye, clearly having gained some insights. After a long while, he looked at Xun Shuang with deep respect, picked up his pen again, and began to write, recording the most valuable insights and experiences in governance.

"The reform method of the great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang was to manipulate existing property rights (regulations and records), existing aristocratic families (fame and fortune), and existing annual taxes (reductions and substitutions) without profoundly affecting the interests of the old classes. This approach maximized the likelihood of implementation with minimal resistance. It was a practical and reformist reform."

"The goal of this reform was to make national finances 'sustainable' and the burden on ordinary people 'affordable,' and then stabilize the order of the reform through 'local education and public opinion.' This was like carving on a needle, a slow and meticulous political undertaking. To achieve this intricate, complex, and profound political operation, one had to have an extremely deep understanding of the political logic of the Han court and local governments. At the same time, the key ministers who presided over the reform had to have a high reputation throughout the country, as well as trustworthy relatives, protégés, and former officials to supervise its implementation in the localities."

"This is the 'official career' explored by the great Confucian scholar Xun Shuang for the Xun family. It is a Confucian political strategy for governing the country and assisting in administration. The Xun family was able to flourish during the Cao Wei dynasty because it had a inherited academic foundation!"

"However, our Taiping Dao can only learn from the analysis of this Confucian reform, to understand the administrative characteristics of the central and local governments of the Han Dynasty, and to understand the methods of local officials, but we cannot adopt and implement it."

"Ultimately, this path of reform for the aristocratic class is not feasible for our Taiping Dao! The consequence of wavering between the aristocracy and the common people is the loss of their trust, allowing the powerful clans to win the final victory."

(End of this chapter)