Great Song Dynasty Writer

Chapter 259 Shifting the blame is a good method

Can killing solve the problem?
That definitely can't be solved!
In feudal society, limited by the low productivity of the small-scale peasant economy, it was inevitable that an intermediate class of "clerks" would exist between "officials" and "commoners," which was determined by the economic base.

As Lu Beigu had seen and heard along his journey, although the commodity economy had developed to some extent in the Song Dynasty, it was only reflected in transportation hubs and major cities. In the vast countryside, people still lived a self-sufficient life of farming and weaving.

Because there was no sufficiently developed transportation network and modes of transport, nor efficient and fast information communication channels, officials had to rely on "clerks" in towns and "clerks" in villages to communicate with local "clans" if they wanted to manage their jurisdiction.

Only in this way can the taxes due each year be collected, and the corvée labor and projects that should be performed be carried out by someone.

Without the large number of officials widely distributed throughout the counties acting as intermediaries, the entire empire's governance system would be paralyzed, and human and material resources would be impossible to effectively utilize.

Therefore, killing not only fails to curb the corruption of officials, but also leads to an expansion of individual power due to the reduction in the number of people in each class.

The more power an individual wields, the less constrained their opportunities for corruption become—this is easy to understand.

So, can we restrict or constrain the corruption of officials by establishing a supervisory system as the main means?
Unfortunately, that's not possible either.

Because "supervision" itself is a power, and any power has the potential to be used for profit. Moreover, the supervisory system will be assimilated as it grows, making it impossible to guarantee that supervisory personnel will always exercise their powers responsibly.

If we take this path, we will fall into a vicious cycle where the Eastern Depot supervises the Embroidered Uniform Guard and the Western Depot supervises the Eastern Depot, creating an endless cycle.

Therefore, it can only be used as a supplementary means.

What about improving benefits?

The treatment of "officials" in politics and economics was destined to be inferior to that of scholar-officials. This was determined by the reality of the Song Dynasty. To put it bluntly, the Song Dynasty did not have that much money.

The current excessive bureaucracy is already pushing the treasury to its limit. If the solution is to simply increase the salaries of officials, and then create a fourth excessive bureaucracy, the Song Dynasty will be on the verge of financial collapse.

Moreover, as the old saying goes, "A man's greed is like a snake trying to swallow an elephant!"

The only effect of improving benefits is for the moment of "improvement".

Later on, these benefits will be taken for granted.

Two typical historical examples illustrate this: the income of officials in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Ming dynasty officials had extremely low official incomes, and their families struggled to survive on their meager salaries. Even Hai Rui, known for his incorruptibility, could only afford to buy two catties of meat to celebrate his mother's birthday. In contrast, Qing dynasty officials received a staggering allowance, a hundred times their official salaries, making their income extremely high and ensuring they had no worries about money.

But the result?

The result is that officials, regardless of whether they have extremely low or extremely high incomes, will still engage in rampant corruption.

Therefore, increasing the income of "officials" is not a viable solution.

In short, Lu Beigu had already considered all three of these methods when he discussed them with Jiang Xinghuo in their office at Jiang University in modern times.

In the Ming Dynasty, if one held supreme power, one could use the Industrial Revolution and the imperial power to extend to the countryside to undermine the special status of "officials" in grassroots governance.

However, in the Song Dynasty at that time, the conditions for developing an industrial revolution were not met, and the imperial power was inherently weak, so there were even fewer practical solutions.

Wang Anshi's piercing gaze was fixed on Lu Beigu's face, awaiting his answer. "Lord Wang."

After a moment of contemplation, Lu Beigu's voice broke the silence in the warm pavilion like a stone thrown into a deep pool.

“Severe punishments can deter evil for a time, but they cannot eradicate the root of evil for generations. Bloodshed is not the result of benevolent governance, nor is it a strategy for long-term stability.”

Lu Beigu paused, his gaze sweeping over everyone present before finally settling on Wang Anshi: "In my opinion, to resolve the predicament of 'lacking the means to support oneself but possessing the ability to ruin one's family,' a single drastic measure is insufficient. A three-pronged approach is necessary to alleviate the situation somewhat."

"Firstly, clerks are not inherently evil. Their exploitation of the people for personal gain stems from their lack of stable income and moral character. Therefore, a budget for clerks' expenses should be set so that they can support their families and avoid the worry of hunger and cold. This is a fundamental solution to cut off their 'inevitable' embezzlement."

Wang Anshi frowned, clearly considering the feasibility of this plan quickly.

“The national treasury is shrinking day by day, and the salaries of officials need to be reduced. How can we support these thousands of clerks? Moreover, most of these people are local hereditary and their family wealth is not necessarily lacking.”

"Your Excellency is wise." Lu Beigu said calmly, "What I am referring to is not the issuance of a fixed salary to each clerk, but rather that the scope of expenses required for clerks in each prefecture and county already has a rough estimate, which can be standardized like 'official funds' and used specifically for the expenses of clerks. The source of this money is either a fixed amount allocated from the local 'provincial' funds or verified by the Transport Commissioner's Office, so that it is legitimate and not a pretext for secretly apportioning it."

Upon hearing this, Wang Anshi seemed to ponder.

Since passing the imperial examination in the second year of the Qingli era, he had spent twenty years working his way up in local government offices, and he knew exactly how they operated.

Therefore, Wang Anshi quickly realized that this matter was very easy to carry out and feasible.

This idea was inspired by what Lu Beigu learned when he passed through Yuezhou, when Wang Tao, the military judge of Yuezhou, used "official funds" to treat them to a meal and give them gifts.

Why didn't the Song Dynasty's system of clerks learn from the "public funds" system?

Since the system of "official expenses" for entertainment expenses, which is a local expense, was formed out of custom and has been subject to considerable constraints since it was established, the expenses for clerks and other officials, which are also local expenses for personnel expenses and have also become customary, can also be formalized into a formal system!

As I said before, having a system is better than having no system at all.

Because the local government offices of the Song Dynasty had an expense for hiring clerks, but since it was not openly discussed, it was always reported as other expenses.

Instead of living a life of tacit deception, it would be better to establish a system where the expenses of clerks and officials are recorded as "official expenses" based on the actual needs of the prefectural and county governments. This would make it easier to verify, even though verification is usually just a formality, it would still have some deterrent effect on paper.

Seeing that Wang Anshi understood, Lu Beigu continued.

“The county and prefectural government offices are often filled with redundant staff and overstaffed. Among ten officials, five or six are probably redundant. As long as the number can be controlled, the effect of ‘eliminating the redundant and retaining the elite’ can be achieved naturally. As for who to dismiss, that is an internal matter of the county and prefectural government offices. In this way, the total cost can be reduced, while those who are retained can enjoy enough money and silk, so their hearts can be at ease and their actions can be restrained.”

Once a custom is established, it's equivalent to turning the original unspoken rules into explicit rules.

How local governments allocate this money to their clerks and whether to reduce redundant staff in order to maintain basic administrative functions is a matter for the local authorities to decide.

In this way, the conflict between the central government and local authorities was successfully transformed into a conflict within the local government itself.

(End of this chapter)